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Short-Termism and Long-Termism
Michal Barzuzay Eric Talleyz
February 16, 2016
Abstract
A signicant debate in corporate law and nance concerns the role
of activist investors (especially hedge funds) in corporate governance.
Activists, it is often alleged, imprudently privilege short term earn-
ings over superior (but less liquid) long term investments. Activists
counter that they target managers who unjustiably cling to ques-
tionable strategies. While this debate is hardly new, it has grown
increasingly fractious of late. We analyze the activism debate within
a theoretical securities-market setting. In our framework  which
draws from an emerging literature in empirical and experimental -
nance  managers are di¤erentially overcondent (causing them to
favor long-term projects), while investors are di¤erentially present-
biased (causing them to favor short-term liquidity). We allow these
biases to be either fundamental or induced by institutional factors,
and they can occur either in isolation or in conjunction. Equilib-
rium behavior bears an uncanny resemblance to the ongoing activism
debate, providing a new perspective on well-worn battle lines. Pre-
scriptively, we demonstrate that short-termism and long-termism can
have symbiotic attributes. Consequently, an optimalcorporate law
and governance regime should account for both e¤ects, as well their
possible interaction.
First Version: October 2015. Many thanks to Ryan Bubb, Giuseppe Dari-Matucci,
Ron Gilson, Andrew Hayashi, Paul Mahoney, Justin McCrary, Josh Mitts, Alessio Pacces,
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You can cut all the owers, but you cannot keep spring from coming.
Pablo Neruda
1 Introduction
A committed socialist, Neruda could hardly have foreseen how prophetic his
observation would become in the inner sanctum of Western capitalism: the
corporate boardroom. The inexorable arrival of spring portends shareholder
proxy season for most U.S. public companies a signal opportunity for share-
holders to provide feedback and criticism to corporate duciaries through a
variety of shareholder proposals, bylaw amendments, executive compensation
approvals, and other governance matters.
But above all else, proxy season heralds the annual rite of director elections
a key outlet for investor irritation and (in the post-hostile takeover era) out-
right electoral challenges. The 2015 proxy season proved particularly riveting,
featuring a pitched proxy prizeght over control of an American corporate
icon: The DuPont E I Nemours & Co. (DuPont). Over the course of many
months, the Trian Fund  an activist hedge fund run by nancier Nelson
Peltz  had amassed a sizable minority block of DuPont shares, clamoring
with growing insistence for governance reforms, strategic changes, capital re-
structuring and board representation. By early 2015, having enjoyed limited
inuence through lobbying e¤orts, Trian launched a no-holds-barred proxy
battle to win the four board seats up for election.
Among proxy ghts, three aspects of the DuPont-Trian battle stand out.
First, as noted above, it involved a prominent, venerable, and newsworthy
US company with a storied pedigree. Second, unlike typical proxy targets
(at least historically), DuPont was not some démodé dinosaur teetering on
the brink; it appeared healthy and growing. Its share value had climbed an
impressive 266% between 2009 and early 2015, far outdistancing the S&P
500 over the same time period (165%).
Third, the rhetorical battle for DuPont was couched in notably apocalyp-
tic terms. Trian alleged that the DuPont board was too coddled, insulated,
and unrealistically smitten with long-term investments of questionable merit;
for their part, incumbent board members invoked the rhetoric of slash-and-
burn short termismby Trian and other activist hedge funds. A statement
from one of the incumbent boards defenders is characteristic:
2
The playbook for many of these activists is to cut research,
throttle back on new businesses, eliminate thousands of jobs,
and leverage the balance sheet. These actions almost always im-
prove the nancial numbers in the next reporting period, but they
weaken the long-term earning power of the company. Worse, they
put the entire enterprise at risk when unpredicted events occur,
such as the next economic downturn.1
During the rst half 2015, both the DuPont incumbents and Trian chal-
lengers became able masters of social media, press releases, and lobbying
tactics to curry favor among voting shareholders of all stripes. Trian was
able to win the public endorsement of signicant proxy advisory rms (such
as Glass-Lewis and ISS), while DuPont secured support of signicant insti-
tutional investors (such as CALPERS). When the dust nally settled, the
incumbents had eked out victories on all four challenged seats. But the mar-
gin was uncomfortably small, with the split largely separating self-identied
long terminvestors (including index funds such as Vanguard, BlackRock
and State Street) from short terminvestors (which included both activist
hedge funds and a sizable portion of retail investors estimated to control
around thirty percent of the shares).2
The governance kerfu­ e at DuPont, and the rhetorical sticu¤s it pre-
cipitated, helps motivate this paper: Indeed, while DuPont is a compelling
case study in its own right, it is also emblematic of a growing recent trend of
shareholder activism3 one that has attracted an increasingly perfervid de-
bate within the corporate law and nance community around contemporary
1Bill George, The DuPont Proxy Contest Is a Battle for the Soul of American Capital-
ism,Hu¢ ngton Post (May 11, 2015) (available at http://www.hu¢ ngtonpost.com/bill-
george/the-dupont-proxy-contest_b_7256490.html)
2Moreover, the victory proved pyrrhic for DuPonts management team. By the fall of
2015, less than a half year after the incumbentselectoral triumph, CEO Ellen Kullman
resigned amid disappointing earnings announcements. We return to this coda below.
3Although there is no universal denition of shareholder activism, most functional
denitions explicitly or implicitly view it as combining (a) the proactive and strategic use
of a public companys corporate governance system; (b) by a single shareholder and/or
coordinated group; (c) who has typically purchased equity with this activity in mind;
(d) and who seeks to have inuence over corporate a¤airs and decision making. While
the motivations of activists can of course be far reaching, for purposes of this paper we
focus on activists who hope to use strateges (a) through (d) as part of a prot-motivated
investment strategy so-called "economic" activists (which includes most activist hedge
funds).
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activisms merits.
There is little doubt that activism has become a force to be reckoned
with among U.S. issuers. The last fteen years bear witness to a discernible
escalation of proxy ghts similar to DuPonts (see Figure 1). Moreover, even
as the number of proxy challengers has escalated, they have enjoyed greater
success: dissidents now gain some measure of victory (through settlement
or outright victory) in over two-thirds of the challenges they launch. The
burgeoning success of proxy ghts is arguably reected in the contempora-
neous growth of activist hedge funds, which have ballooned from under $100
million in assets under management in 2000 to over $140 billion today (HFR
2014). In short, activism pays.4
While the activism trend is remarkable, the cacophonous debate sur-
4It bears noting that Figure 1 almost certainly understates the e¤ects of activism: proxy
ghts are but the nuclear end gameof activist engagements, and many activists exert
inuence (including procuring board representation) without ever launching a proxy ght.
These other levers of inuence while di¢ cult to observe directly can be measured (in
part) with other proxies, such as Schedule 13D lings, shareholder proposals, and public
bear hugletters from activists to boards.
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rounding it really steals the show. The competing positions are by now well
trodden terrain.5 Activists, it is alleged, privilege short term earnings over
more durable (but less liquid) investments in long term value, leading to busi-
ness decisions that not only forsake long term value for immediate gain, but
do so in a manner that sacrices net present value. (See, e.g., Lipton 2013).
And indeed, several studies of hedge-fund engagements nd that hedge fund
activism signicantly curbs long-term investments in research and develop-
ment, durable assets, and workforce capital (Co¤ee & Palia 2014; Allaire, &
Dauphin 2015). The compensation structures of hedge fund managers ap-
pear, moreover, to be especially skewed towards short-term payo¤s (Lim et
al. 2015). In addition, the practice of extracting hushmail(a descendant of
1980s-style greenmail) has gained traction of late, whereby an activist takes
an ownership block in an issuer and agitates for capital disbursements, only
to settle with the issuer by selling back its stake at prevailing prices (Ger-
stein et al. 2014).6 Moreover, the e¤ect of activism need not be limited only
to those rms personally experiencing activist engagements: boards of other
issuers may well be a¤ected too, fearing that their own governance struc-
tures leave them vulnerable, and thus capitulating sua sponte to anticipated
activist demands. That short-termists have had such wider and signicant
e¤ects  it is often argued  bodes poorly for future stability and growth,
within both individual companies and the broader US economy (Conference
Board 2015).
Activists, in contrast, openly and vigorously contest the charge of short-
termism,asserting it is little more than bluster eclipsing substance. They
cite several empirical studies that suggest activists bolster shareholder value.
Most notably, announcements of activist engagements are usually followed
by positive and signicant abnormal returns (Bebchuk et al. 2014; Boyson &
5Indeed, traces of this same debate go back decades. See, e.g., Porter (1992).
6See, e.g, Greenwood & Schor (2009) (positive returns associated with activist en-
gagements are largely concentrated among rms that are eventually acquired). While not
categorically objectionable, hushmail can represent a net wealth transfer from other share-
holders if the activists intervention itself gives rise to an episodic asset bubble. As with
greenmail, however, Delaware courts have shown little willingness to scrutinize such prac-
tices, granting them signicant protection under the Business Judgment Rule. See, e.g.,
Ryan v. Gersahaney (C.A. # 9992-VCP; Del. Ch., April 2015) (dismissing a derivative
action challenging a hushmail transaction between ADT Corp. and Corvex Management,
LP, an activist hedge fund). Moreover, the repurchase of an activists shares at prevailing
market prices appears to sidestep both federal tax penalties and state law prohibitions on
the payment of green mail (Gernstein et al 2014).
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Mooradian 2010; Brav et al. 2008, 2013, 2015; Cli¤ord 2008; Greenwood &
Schor 2009; Klein & Zur 2009). And, while some of these price increases in-
ure to activists alone, other shareholders and investors appear to benet too
(Bebchuk et al. 2013). Further, defenders argue, activist engagements do not
obviously trade short-term gains for long term ill: companies that experience
an activist engagement have been found to experience long term performance
similar to non-engaged rms (albeit amid some statistical noise; Bebchuk et
al. 2015). Viewed from this perspective, the lambasting of short-termism
is but a grandstanding apologia for managerial entrenchment. Fetishizing
the long term for long-termisms sake, activists assert  irrespective of con-
crete company benets  warrants neither our collective sympathy nor the
protective cloak of the Business Judgment Rule.7
It is hardly novel to observe that participants in this debate have long
been talking past one another (Co¤ee & Palia 2014). In our view, at least
part of the debates dysfunction stems from a failure of many participants to
attend to fundamental questions about market structure and human behav-
ior to moor their positions. Critics of activism, for example, have struggled
to articulate the reasons behind the short-termist frenzy they perceive to im-
peril responsible stewardship (Roe 2015). Why, for example, wouldnt more
patient, long-horizon investors have strong incentives to neutralize short-
termism by retaining their shares (and even increasing their holdings) when-
ever long-term projects have greater overall value? Moreover, even investors
with short time horizons must nd a ready market to unwind their positions
upon exit. It is not obvious that they will support investment choices that
generate cash ows in the near term while undercutting residual value. If
the short-termism criticism is to have legs, then, it must be because of a
market failure that distorts price discovery during activist engagements an
account that seems absent (or at least suppressed) in their rhetoric.
Defenders of activism, too, have failed to situate several of their cen-
tral claims convincingly. To the extent that activists play a role in creat-
ing asset bubbles in targeted companies, for example, immediate abnor-
mal returns upon an activist engagement signal little more than ephemeral,
7Delaware courts, by and large, have thus far extended something akin to Business
Judgment Rule protection for anti-activist defenses. See, e.g., Third Point LLC v.
Sothebys, C.A. No. 9469-VCP (Del. Chancery Ct. May 2014) (using the deferential
Unocal standard to uphold a poison pill of defendant corporation triggered by a 10%
block of shares amassed by an activist, but a 20% block of shares amassed by passive
investors).
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wealth-transferring price volatility (Greenwood & Schor 2009). Moreover,
comparing long term performance of engaged to non-engaged issuers holds
limited probative value if the prospective threat of activism induces boards
of non-engaged companies to adopt the same activist-favored tactics as their
counterparts (as many have long decried Lipton 2013).8 Even the notion
of agency costs / empire building the standard canonical assertion that an-
imates much of the activist positivist critique of boards may have limited
explanatory force when juxtaposed to the last fteen yearsworth of post-
Sarbanes Oxley / Dodd-Frank regulatory scrutiny, which has if anything
dampened the private benets of control thought traditionally to motivate
duciaries (Talley 2015).9 Activist advocates also face di¢ culties in recon-
ciling their position with another recent trend among U.S. public o¤erings:
the rapid rise in entrenched governance structures (such as dual-class stock),
whereby founders and initial insiders retain super-majority control of a public
company. Such structures are at an all-time high among technology IPOs,
representing just under a third (by value) of the sectors recent deal volume
(Braithwaite 2015). The growing popularity of entrenched governance struc-
tures at the nancially critical IPO stage often to preempt future activism 
challenges the proposition that todays brand of activist engagement augurs
unalloyed company value.10
Finally, a remarkable aspect of the activism debate from both sides is
its increasingly uncompromising tone (even among typically even-tempered
academics). Advocates from both camps have grown sharper and more
impassioned in advancing their claims, seemingly convinced of the utter in-
eluctability of their positions. While some of this rhetoric is no doubt per-
formative, much of it has (in our view) deeper roots: The activism debate
8In other words, if activism distorts corporate behavior o¤ the equilibrium path,
then an observed long-term statistical similarity of engaged and non-engaged rms is both
unremarkable and uninformative.
9And in any event, todays activists appear not to have disabled managers from retain-
ing their positions (or even altering executive compensation structures), so long as such
managers are willing rebalance the rms capital structure and investment portfolio in a
manner favored by activist investors. See note __ infra.
10Although companies that are already listed seemingly do not have recourse to dual
class structures, even that observation overstates the case. Listed companies bu¤eted by
activist pressures may well be able to turn to the private equity buyers, as did Dell with
Silver Lake Management in 2013. And, in fact, the newly-private Dell has itself become a
private-equity buyer, recently announcing a take-private deal for activist-beleagured EMC
(and its held subsidiary VMWare). See McGurk et al. (2015).
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is compelling reading, in part, because many of its most ardent participants
appear to come by their positions honestly.
In this paper, we reassess the activism debate, o¤ering a new theoreti-
cal account of managerial long termism and hedge-fund short termism. Our
framework is inspired by two well-documented phenomena in corporate -
nance. First, mounting empirical evidence suggests that corporate man-
agers are frequently susceptible to optimism bias regarding their selection
and stewardship of projects (e.g., Malmendier & Tate 2005; 2008). By our
reading of this literature, overcondence seems most plausible in the context
of long-term projects, where benchmarks are scarce, interim results recon-
dite, and statistical noise signicant. We refer to this skewed managerial
infatuation with long-term projects as long-termism. Overcondence-driven
long-termism can cause corporate duciaries to be too invested in their own
visions, and too quick to dismiss alternative (and shorter-term) proposals of
shareholder activists. Long-termism might additionally explain why invest-
ment is sensitive to availability of internal funds (Malmendier & Tate 2005),
and why founders would embrace relatively entrenching governance regimes
at the IPO stage, in order to secure (sensibly, in their view) breathing room
to realize their long-term vision.
Second, we draw inspiration from a growing literature suggesting that
investors may be di¤erentially susceptible to present-biases in trading o¤
current and future payo¤s. In some cases, these present biases may be the
result of deep preferences (e.g., hyperbolic discounting a la Laibson 1997;
ODonoghue & Rabin 1999, 2001). In other instances, they may be induced
by extraneous forces (such as hedge-fund compensation structures or clients
need for liquidity; Ben David et al. 2012; Lim et al. 2015). In either case,
however, present biases can introduce a type of time inconsistency, which in
turn may o¤er a reason why prices in nancial markets can  in heat of
the moment  overvalue business plans yielding immediate payo¤s, even at
the opportunity cost of foregoing more lucrative long term alternatives. In
such settings, present-biased shareholders may place signicant pressure on
managers to abandon long-term strategies in favor of less protable short-
term payo¤s, and asset prices may reect those preferences.
Our model, therefore, explores corporate decision making in a securities-
market setting among potentially biased players, designed specically to ex-
plore how managerial optimism and investor short-termism plausibly inter-
act. We allow for di¤erentiated degrees of both managerial long-termism and
investor short-termism; a governance structure whose degree of entrenchment
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can be varied; a possibility for shareholders to use the governance regime to
revolt against the managers plan; and an initial IPO stage that prices
securities sold to outside investors by a manager/founder.
Our framework yields several insights relevant to both the activism debate
and to behavioral corporate governance more generally. From a theoretical
perspective, the simultaneous interaction of two distinct biases among oth-
erwise strategic players presents somewhat of a modelling challenge. Our
analytic approach, in fact, requires that we posit an equilibrium concept that
is (to our knowledge) new to the literature, characterizing the interactions
of agents who themselves posess durable preference biases, yet who are also
astute and strategic in their assessment of their counterparts.
More practically, our analysis yields several general insights about the
shareholder activism debate insights that not only have interpretive con-
tent, but also carry real-world implications and policy repercussions. Among
them:
 Overcondent managers tend, in equilibrium, to be overly attracted
to long-term projects ex ante, eschewing short-term alternatives that
are more economically advantageous. Accordingly, equilibrium share-
holder uprisings tend to target themost overcondent of managers who
embrace long-term strategies (see Corollaries 2 and 4).
 Nevertheless, present biases can also induce ine¢ cient shareholder up-
risings, wherein managers are forced to jettison long-term projects even
when continuation would be more e¢ cient (Corollary 2). When ex-
treme, equilibrium present biases can preclude the pursuit of long-term
projects categorically even those that are value-enhancing (Corollary
1).
 Even though unbiased investors disagree with their present-biased coun-
terparts about corporate policy, they benet from present-biased share-
holders too: for such shareholders can introduce price discounts that
allow unbiased shareholders to realize positive economic rents in equi-
librium (Lemma 2).
 When equilibrium prices reect investorspresent biases, activist en-
gagements can lead to pricing bubblesupward shocks in the rms
market valuation that are the artifact of marginal investors time-
inconsistent preferences, rather than overall fundamentals (Corollary
3).
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 Managers tend, in equilibrium, to favor governance regimes that appear
entrenching (such as super-majority/unanimity voting rules). Such
structures need not be value destroying, however, if they vest control
in shareholders who are less likely to manifest short-termism (Lemma
5).
 The simultaneous presence of managerial overcondence and investor
present biases can be symbiotic, striking a balance between ine¢ cient
shareholder revolts ex post, and ine¢ cient managerial project choices
ex ante. Consequently, the normative implications for corporate law
may be relatively modest when the two e¤ects interact (Corollary 5).
 Because actors in our model perceive othersbiases but not their own,
in equilibrium they remain adamantly convinced of the righteousness
of their own positions and dismissive of inconsistent views (a sentiment
that patently pervades the ongoing debate over activism).
Several caveats to our analysis warrant attention before proceeding. First,
because our focus here is on manifest preference biases (overcondence and
present bias), we will give necessarily shorter shrift to other factors in the
activism debate that also carry signicance. Most notably, although our an-
alytic framework starts with a conventional managerial moral hazard model,
agency costs will not play a focal role in our analysis. This is not meant to
reect our view that agency costs are completely irrelevant to the story; to
the contrary, we believe such factors should and do play a material role in
this debate on both sides, even in ways that intersect with behavioral biases
(See, e.g., Bolton et al. 2006). Rather, we push agency costs slightly o¤-
stage principally to facilitate exposition of behavioral biases we also think
important.11
11That said, as alluded to above, conventional agency cost arguments may not be as
powerful here as one might think. A common agency cost argument for hedge funds
activism, for example, asserts that incumbent managers seek to build empires, which fa-
cilitate greater private benets (Bebchuk et al. 2014). Yet, evidence is not especially
consistent with activism limiting empire building. As others have pointed out, if abnor-
mal returns in response to activism announcements reected decline in agency costs, one
would expect activists to lobby for changes to executive compensation. Yet, the positive
market response is not associated with these kinds of activism, but rather with changes to
corporate investment and strategy (Co¤ee & Palia 2014). In addition, the idea that man-
agers overinvest for personal gains, at the expense of shareholders and lower share value, is
10
Second, although we primarily highlight behavioral biases on both the
investor side and the managerial side of a nancial market, the framework
we develop is amenable to a rational-actor framework too. Much of our
analysis would still follow, for example, if biases were induced institution-
ally (e.g., through compensation structures) rather than an organic artifact
of deep preferences. Moreover, we allow signicant exibility in how such
biases are distributed among actors: Standard expected utility maximiza-
tion (with no biases) is in fact a special case of our model, allowing us to
analyze equilibrium behavior as one varies manifest bias on either side of
the market (Camerer & Talley 2007). In a related vein, although our model
commits as it must to particular drivers of short-termism (present bias)
and long-termism (overcondence), other types of behavioral bias could gen-
erate similar predictions. For example, a theory of salience (e.g., Bordalo,
Gennaioli & Shleifer 2012) could also predict short-termism if shareholders
are systematically attracted to projects whose expected returns are more
readily estimated and quantied, as may plausibly be the case for short-term
projects (c.f., Shefrin & Statman 1984). The predictions that such alter-
native approaches generate are likely to overlap considerably with those we
generate here.12
Finally, preference biases tend to magnify a pre-existing challenge about
the normative content of corporate law: What, exactly, is corporate law
supposed to maximize to begin with? This question is di¢ cult enough
to answer in the rational actor framework, where shareholder primacy rou-
tinely butts heads with other potential normative maximands that include
non-shareholder constituencies (such as creditors, employees, customers and
managers themselves). In settings where shareholder and manager prefer-
ences may be inconsistent over time or by context, the normative challenge is
redoubled. To the extent that we are interested in such normative questions,
however,13 we must specify a benchmark welfare measure. In what follows,
we will identify an optimalcorporate governance structure to be the one
that maximizes the expected enterprise value of the rm (the sum of ex-
not considered that convincing anymore. Compensation structures have changed, so that
managers do not benet that easily from ine¢ cient purchases (Id.) Managers plausibly
care about their reputation, trajectory, and in general are high achievers who are willing
to work hard to meet their goals (rather then perquisite consumption).
12We discuss this issue at greater length at the end of the paper. See Section 4, infra.
13Most of our analysis is neutral about welfare implications. Only at the end do we
address these larger normative questions.
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pected shareholder and manager payo¤s), evaluated in the absence of either
investor present bias or managerial overcondence. Consequently, while a
biased investor or manager may perceive herself as favoring one choice over
another, our normative frame will assess and evaluate that same choice from
the perspective of an actor harboring no preference biases (induced or or-
ganic).
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the large (and grow-
ing) empirical literature on managerial overcondence and investor present
biases. We show that this literature makes a convincing case that at least
in some settings both phenomena are plausible, in isolation or conjunc-
tion. At the same time, the literature has shed relatively little light on the
incidence (and implications) of the mutual interaction of these phenomena
(particularly within the activism debate). Section 3 develops a simple the-
oretical framework that is adequate to the task. There we presume that
both investors and corporate managers are prone to the biases described
above, and we study the implications of such biases within a setting with
active securities markets and corporate governance processes. We also pro-
pose an equilibrium concept for settings in which preference-biased agents
interact strategically with other such agents. We apply this concept to our
structural framework to draw out various of the intuitions highlighted above
and characterize our core equilibrium result (Proposition 1). Section 4 ex-
plores extensions to our modeling framework, divining both prescriptive and
empirical implications of our key insights. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
As noted above, part of our enterprise in this paper is synthetic: we seek to
analyze the activism debate by intersecting two distinct conceptual accounts
from behavioral nance: managerial overcondence and investor present bias.
This approach is more challenging than it rst appears (or at least than it
rst appeared to us): for our synthesis endeavors to bridge a nearly hermetic
divide between two principal sub-literatures in behavioral nance: The rst
relaxes rationality assumptions for investors only, assuming managers to be
unbiased and rational; the second strand does the opposite (Baker & Wur-
gler 2013; Malmendier & Tate 2012).14 In many interesting applications, of
14The nearly empty intersection between these sub-literatures (see Baker & Wurgler
2013) may be due in part to the absence of a ready equilibrium concept amenable to
12
course, behavioral biases may simultaneously occur in both places; and we
consider this to be one of those applications.
Accordingly, we take some time here to o¤er a high-level review of the
literature on both managerial overcondence and investor present bias, and
conditions under which either (or both) may pervade corporate governance
settings within public companies.
2.1 Managerial Overcondence
Managerial biases are now part of mainstream corporate nance. One par-
ticularly salient instantiation is managerial overcondence, or optimism,
where robust literature documents the incidence of managerial overcon-
dence, including within corporate capital budgeting decisions. Less heralded
in the literature is a sub-thesis we advance here: that overcondent man-
agers tend to exhibit such biases most visibly with long-term projects. The
alignment of overcondence with long termism is natural, since long-term
projects tend to be less liquid, harder to benchmark, and less transparent for
outsiders (or sometimes even insiders) to evaluate.
2.1.1 Overcondence Generally
Overcondence is common, and it has been documented in numerous ex-
perimental settings. Most individuals rank themselves above average across
di¤erent skills, and the likelihood for positive life events, and below aver-
age for the likelihood of di¤erent negative life events (Larwood & Whittaker
1977; Svenson 1981; Weinstein 1980). Senior corporate executives are not
immune to such proclivities. If anything, they are more susceptible. Indeed,
several studies report direct evidence for executivesovercondence in partic-
ular (e.g., Ben David et al. 2013; Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2010; Larwood &
Whittaker 1977). Perception of control over outcomes (Langer, 1975), com-
mitment to the outcome (Weinstein, 1980), and strong skills (Kruger 1999;
Camerer & Lovallo 1999) all of which characterize CEOs relationship to
their projects are associated with high degrees of optimism. Furthermore,
the low frequency of feedback CEOs receive given their position atop the or-
ganizational food chain, and the noisiness of feedback from the stock market,
help reinforce and perpetuate overcondence (Nisbett and Ross, 1980).
settings where both sides of a market potentially manifest biases. We will propose such
an equilibrium concept below (see Section 3).
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If managers are overly optimistic about their favored projects, that over-
condence likely a¤ects their capital budgeting decisions too. They may,
for example, draw too heavily on internal sources of funds; and if they also
believe the company shares to be undervalued they may underinvest from
external funds. As a result, overcondence should lead to excessive sensi-
tivity of investment to cash ows (Heaton 2002). Building on this intuition,
Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b) constructed two di¤erent measures for
overcondence, testing their metrics against the sensitivity of corporate in-
vestment to cash ow. The rst, an option-based measure, measures man-
agementtendency to hold options unexercised long after they have vested.
Absent overcondence, managers (whose human capital is not diversied)
should exercise their options when they vest and liquidate them immediately
(Sen & Tumarkin 2015). By failing to exercise (or exercising and holding),
managers reveal their beliefs that the company shares are undervalued. The
second, a press-based measure, focuses on public perception of managers as
overcondent, based on news paper citations. Both measures are associated
with high sensitivity of investment, measured by CAPEX, to cash ow re-
turns (Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2005b).15
A survey-based study similarly found unambiguous e¤ects of managerial
overcondence in investment choices. Surveying public company CFOs on
a quarterly basis over a ten-year period, Ben David et al. (2013) nd that
they typically underestimate the volatility of their companiesfuture nancial
performance. The results were signicant: only in one-third of the cases
the actual realized performance fell within the CFOspredicted condence
interval. Moreover, total rm-level investment tended to be higher the greater
the degree of overcondent miscalibration.
Overcondence similarly appears to a¤ect appetites for acquisitions. Mal-
mendier and Tate (2008) nd that overcondent managers are more likely to
acquire other rms, and that their acquisitions tend to portend more extreme
negative returns. In a similar vein, Banerjee et al. (2015) utilize the passage
the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) to test the hypothesis that board monitor-
ing could limit excessive, overcondence-driven investments. They nd that
following SOX overcondent CEOs reduced total investment, as well as its
sensitivity to cash ow and increased dividends. Tobins Q and post acquisi-
tion performance both grew in rms with overcondent CEOs following the
15Malmendier and Tate do not make welfare determinations, however: as they explain,
whether managers overinvest or underinvest depends on their initial capital structure.
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passage of SOX.
Other managerial behaviors such as earnings management and nan-
cial reporting appear similarly to interact in a consistent way with over-
condence measures (Schrand and Zechman 2010; Graham, Harvey & Puri
2010). And, both options-based and press-based measures for overcondence
were associated with a higher likelihood for rms to issue earnings forecasts,
greater optimism in the forecasts issued, and a higher likelihood to miss those
forecasts subsequently (Hribar & Yang 2015).
2.1.2 Overcondence and Long Termism
Although somewhat overlooked in the literature, managers are more prone to
overcondence when it comes to longer-term projects. Beyond its intuitive
appeal, this posited relationship between overcondence and long-termism
enjoys support in the experimental literature. Overcondence has long been
known to be signicantly higher when uncertainty is large (Irwin 1953, Ar-
mor and Taylor 2002; Van den Steen 2004). Long-term projects tend to
involve higher uncertainty along several dimensions, including the macro-
economic uctuations, stock market performance, industry performance, and
internal factors such as changes to managersability, personal factors, etc.
While clear and immediate sanctions can mitigate overcondence (Armor
and Taylor 2002; Stockens 2000), for long-term investments those sanctions
are necessarily more distant and have noisier triggers.
Long-term investments also weaken potential learning from feedback, as
they are associated with higher attribution bias the tendency to take re-
sponsibility for success but not for failure (Langer & Roth, 1975). Over a
long duration, managers would have greater opportunities to attribute fail-
ure to exogenous events. Experimental evidence lends support to the intu-
ition that individualsovercondence increases along investment time hori-
zon. Subjects who were asked to predict their performance in a number of
tasks were signicantly more optimistic well before the task than immedi-
ately prior to performing it (Gilovich & Medvec 1993). Similarly, college
seniorspredictions about their rst-year salaries became less optimistic as
graduation approached. Juniorsand sophomoresoptimism, in contrast, did
not decline over the year, suggesting that the proximity to benchmarking
moments uniquely dampens optimism (Shepperd et al, 1996).
Among public company executives, moreover, the link between overcon-
dence and long-term horizons appears prevalent as well. Analyzing three- to
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ve-year earnings growth forecasts among executives, Babmer et al. (2013)
nd that executives tend to be highly overoptimistic, signicantly exceed-
ing actual growth rates. The average long-term growth forecast predicted
(15%) was ve times larger than the average realized growth rate (3%). In-
deed, there is even evidence that overcondent CEOs specically bargain
for more options-intensive compensation packages (Humphrey-Jenner et al.
2016), which overwhelmingly have multi-year vesting and expiration periods
(Cadman et al. 2013).
Similarly, long-term overcondence among executives appears to be more
sustainable and resistant to feedback from long-term investment returns.
Chen et al. (2015) nd that overcondent CEO are less likely to respond
to corrective feedback, and especially so for forecasts with a long-term hori-
zon, possibly since the passage of time provides several pretexts for nger
pointing. Specically, Chen et al. (2015) study a sample of managers whose
initial forecasts included material errors, nding that overcondent managers
were less likely to improve their forecastsaccuracy over time. The results
were especially strong for forecasts with long time horizons.
Finally, long-term investment horizons appear to amplify the e¤ect that
overcondence exerts over capital budgeting decisions. CFOs that replied to
the Ben David et al. (2013) survey were asked to make a short-term (one-
year) and a long-term (ten-year) prediction. While corporate investment was
positively correlated with both short-term and long-term overcondence, the
relationship was especially strong for long-term over-condence: one stan-
dard deviation in miscalibration or optimism invests 0.7%, or 1.1% more
each year, on a basis of 8.8% average investment intensity (Ben David et al.
2013).
If as we conjecture here managerial overcondence is particularly con-
centrated in long-term investment projects, it would help to explain several
phenomena in the activism debate. As Malmendier & Tate demonstrate,
overcondence could lead managers to invest excessively from internal funds,
especially when the rms internal funds are signicant (Malmendier & Tate
2005a, 2005b). Since hedge funds activism frequently limits internal funds by
forcing dividends distribution, share repurchases, and leverage increases (Cof-
fee & Palia 2014), it also limits investments that are driven by over condence
and long-termism. Moreover, overcondence as to long-term projects would
help to explain why hedge fund activism curbs one particular kind of capital
budgeting activity: R&D investments (Allaire & Dauphin 2015; Co¤ee &
Palia 2014). Given their long-term horizon and inherent uncertainty, R&D
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projects are especially prone to long-termism. And, overcondent managers
tend to invest more in R&D, and achieve more patents and patent citations
(Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 2010).
2.2 Investor Present Bias
On the investor side of the market, short termism is naturally linked to the
sizable literature on investorspresent bias. Market participants with present
bias will tend to discount future income streams inconsistently, placing dis-
proportionate weight on current income streams relative to future streams.
The inconsistency occurs because individuals tend to strike di¤erent trade-
o¤s between the same set of payo¤s at di¤erent periods of time.
2.2.1 Present Bias Generally
Although the literature on present bias is rich and large, much of it em-
anated from a need to reconcile decision theory with experimental and em-
pirical data. Among psychologists, the well-known Stanford marshmallow
experiments (Mischel et al. 1972) provided a compelling early example
present bias among young children.16 However, a well-known experiment
soon thereafter (Thaler 1981) documented signicant inconsistencies in how
adult subjects implicitly discount time payo¤s associated with monetary re-
wards. Subjects asked to report their subjective present value of a xed sum
of money paid in the far distant future (10 years) and in the near distant
future (one month). Subjects displayed extreme discounting for all future
payo¤s, with a disproportionate discontinuity for payo¤s realized in the near
distant future suggesting a discounting kinkbeyond the current period.
Moreover, present biases can induce evident preference inconsistencies over
time, causing ones trade-o¤ between two future payo¤s to dampen (or even
reverse) as the synchronous time for arrival of both options declines (Benabib
et al. 2009). For example, individuals who prefer to receive $150 in eleven
years over $100 in ten years tend to reverse that preference once the proposi-
tion becomes a choice between receiving $150 in one year versus $100 today.
(Green et al 1994; Kirby & Herrnstein 1995). Such preference inconsisten-
cies appear in some ways to be biologically hard wired, and are not limited
16We will stipulate for current purposes the assertion that preschoolers have dispositions
that are noncomparable to and distinct from high-powered hedge fund managers or CEOs.
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to humans (see, e.g., Ainslee & Herrnstein 1981, documenting the e¤ect in
animals).
2.2.2 Present Bias in Financial Markets
To be sure, several studies documenting present bias have focused on non-
nancial assets (marshmallows, movie videos, and other consumption items).
By no means, however, are nancial assets peripheral. Not only were several
foundational studies of present bias based on nancial claims (e.g., Thaler
1981, supra), but the bias has been detected robustly in a variety of nancial
market settings. Fredreick et al. (2003) review the signicant literature
on present bias, summarizing dozens of individual studies across a variety
of experimental and topical domains. A strong plurality of experimental
studies in the laboratory and eld analyze time preferences over nancial
assets, typically with real stakes. (See Frederick et al. 2003, Table 1).
That said, one dimension of typical capital market intensity has been
shown partially to blunt the occurrence of present bias: signicant monetary
stakes. In high-stakes settings, experimental evidence suggests that present
biases attenuate a phenomenon that researchers have identied as the mag-
nitude e¤ect. While an individual may, for example, favor $10 today over $11
in a week, the same person may decline the opportunity to receive $10,000
today and choose wait for $11,000 next week (Baker et al. 2003; Benhabib
et al., 2010; Petry, 2001; Raineri & Rachlin, 1993; Thaler, 1981). That said,
some form of present bias still typically can be found in such settings (even if
attenuated). Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that when nancial
stakes grow large, even small perturbations in e¤ective discount rates have
signicant monetary implications. Furthermore, recent research suggests that
the magnitude e¤ect appears to have less bite when contemplating losses as
opposed to gains (and it may even reverse with losses, see Hardesty et al.
2012). If an investor views uses initial purchase price as a reference point
dening gains or losses, then price uctuations might also be characterized
as both gains and losses. Under this interpretation, shorter-term investors
(who have generally purchased shares more recently, and for whom neither
gains nor losses are close to certain) are plausibly the most susceptible to
present bias.
In a related vein, present bias can be sometimes induced through incen-
tives (rather than organic preferences). For example, compensation struc-
tures for hedge fund managers appear similarly to favor short term cash-ow
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generation, particularly among less established funds. Recent research by
Lim et al (2015) analyzes the total compensation benets to hedge fund
managers for actions that increase asset values for shareholders today. They
estimate that for every one dollar increase in investor wealth, hedge fund
manager wealth increases by nearly forty cents, and far more for younger
managers/funds with less established track records. Although this structure
could be due to an induced quality signaling phenomenon (e.g., Holmstrom
1982; Stein 2005; Berk & Green 2004), the structure could induce behav-
ior resembling time-inconsistent preference distortions, particularly if hedge
fund managers have an option of pursuing short term returns at the expense
of long term returns (Lim et al. 2015; Stein 1989). 17
Other factors that may amplify both organic and induced present biases
are structural constraints on investment strategy that serve functional as
limits to arbitrage (Shliefer & Vishney 1990). A growing literature has high-
lighted several such factors that could limit hedge fundsarbitrage options.
In addition to standard asymmetric information arguments, hedge-fund in-
vestors also have to make assessments with respect to the risk of redemption
by other investors (Liu and Mello 2011). Ben David et al (2012) report
evidence from the 2008 nancial crisis consistent with hedge funds facing
signicant limits to arbitrage due to redemption risk. During the nancial
crisis, investorsredemptions and margin calls resulted in hedge funds selling
o¤ approximately a third of their portfoliosassets. Lockup periods not only
failed to dampen the risk, but they were associated with larger redemptions.
Evidence from the technology bubble also is consistent with hedge funds
limits to arbitrage: Rather than correcting prices, hedge funds appeared to
be riding a technology bubble (Brunnermeier & Nagel 2004).
A substantial theoretical literature has emerged in the last two decades
attempting to formalize how present-biased preferences may manifest in an
behavioral economics choice setting. One of the most studied is the con-
cept of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997; ODonoghue & Ra-
17Furthermore, present bias under circumstances may be rooted to rational processes.
For example, if proximate payo¤s are signicantly more ceratin than all other future payo¤s
(as would be the case with dividends, repurchases and distributions from internal funds),
risk aversed investors would rationally exhbit inconsistent discount for time (Sozou 1998).
That said, when present biased behavior is induced by skewed compensation structures,
limits to arbitrage or even risk aversion, the actors would similarly be sophisticated about
their future preferences, but would have little interest in constraining their future choices.
(See Section 4, infra).
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bin 1999, 2001). The discrete-time representation of this account posits
that individuals anticipating at time t a stream of future utility ows Ut =
fut; ut+1;ut+2; :::g will formulate a present value of that stream as follows:
PV (Utj; ) = ut + ut+1 + 2ut+2 + ::: = ut +  
1P
i=1
iut+i (1)
where  denotes a conventional exponential discount factor.18 The factor
 denotes an additional discount factor applied linearly to all future payo¤s
(but not the current one). When  = 1; the expression above converges
to a standard present value formulation. However, when  < 1; the in-
dividual gives disproportionate weight to current utility over future utility
ows. Moreover, as time passes, and each successive payo¤ transitions to the
present,the individuals preferences may manifest inconsistencies, resulting
in preference reversals similar to those observed in laboratory settings.19 Al-
though there are several alternative candidates for representing present bias
within a choice theory paradigm, the (so-called) -model has remained
somewhat dominant in the literature.
The theoretical literature noted above is also signicant because it ex-
poses an additional factor to consider in assessing how (or whether) present
biases would have observable repercussions in securities markets, even if a
material subset of individual traders are subject to such biases: The extent
to which market participants are aware of their own future biases and work
to neutralize them. In the presence of such awareness, traders can take
measures ex ante to neutralize such proclivities. Indeed, a signicant design
feature in most modern dened contribution plans is meant both to induce
individuals to commit ex ante to a future set of trade-o¤s in their retirement
savings, as well as to impose sticky defaultsmeant to mimic optimal sav-
ings trajectories (Bubb and Pildes 2014). In this vein, the - framework has
18The discount factor is inversely and uniquely related to the rate of discount rate
familiar in discounted cash ow analyses. For a given discount rate r; the equivalent
discount factor  =

1
1+r

: In the special case of risk-neutral preferences, cash ows at
each time period can be substituted for utility ows.
19In the above expression, the individual in period t will be indi¤erent between losing
1 unit of utility in period t + 1 to gaining X units in period t + 2; whenever:  ( 1) +
2 (+X)  0 , X  1=: However, once time transitions to period t + 1; the same
individual will favor losing 1 unit of uitility in period t + 1 to gaining X in period t + 2;
whenever X  1= () ; which exceeds 1= whenever  < 1: A preference reversal would
occur whenever 1= < X < 1= () :
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been adapted to account for the distinction between sophisticated and naïve
agents (ODonoghue & Rabin 2001) to suppose that ex ante, an individual
with hyperbolic factor  projects that she will be subject to present bias at
some anticipated level 0 2 [; 1] : This anticipated value may be as low as the
agents actual  (suggesting complete ex ante sophistication of the agent),
or it may be as high as 1 (suggesting complete naïveté). ODonoghue &
Rabin (2001) consider how individuals of varying sophistication may engage
in future choice constrainingmeasures today (e¤ectively tying their future
selves to a metaphorical Ulyssean mast) given the biases they anticipate. In
e¤ect, such agents play a game against their future selves. In the context
of corporate governance, investors who anticipate future present bias might
favor governance structures that constrain future choices (through, say, dual
class structures or super-majority provisions).20
Finally, our synthesis of the literature suggests at least some avenues
through which long-termism and short-termism might coincide ( or match)
in governance disputes. Consider, for example, the documented sensitivity of
investment to cash ow among overcondent managers (Malmendier & Tate
2005a, 2005b); stingy patterns of shareholder distribution and the amass-
ing of large internal funds also increase the likelihood that a rm will be
targeted by hedge fund activism (Brav et al 2008). Similarly, hedge-fund ac-
tivism tends to focus on R&D investments (Allaire & Dauphin 2015; Co¤ee
& Palia 2015), which overcondent managers disproportionally fancy (Hir-
shleifer, Low, and Teoh 2010). On the other hand, activism that forces
governance changes is not associated with abnormal returns; and governance
changes that a¤ect compensation practices or disclosure do not necessarily
restrain overcondence (Malmendier & Tate 2005a, 2005b).
3 A Model of Short Termism and Long Ter-
mism in Corporate Capital Markets
In this section we propose and analyze a theoretical framework to study the
simultaneous interactions of short termism and long termism within a cor-
porate governance / securities market setting. Our aim is to characterize
20That said, when present biased behavior is induced by institutional constraints (e.g.,
skewed compensation structures), the actors would similarly be sophisticated about their
future preferences, but they would have little to gain by constraining their future choices.
(See Section 4, infra, for a more extensive discussion).
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conditions under which short termism and/or long termism can have robust
equilibrium e¤ects on pricing, shareholder preferences and corporate decision
making, as well as to gain insights on the normative / prescriptive implica-
tions of such e¤ects for corporate governance. To concretize our analysis, we
focus on overcondence as the primary source of long termism by managers,
and present bias as the primary source of short termism among sharehold-
ers.21
Although a dynamic model is obviously needed to demonstrate our core
arguments, we keep things as simple as possible, positing a set of interactions
taking place over three periods: an ex ante period (Period 0), and two
ensuing productive periods of investment horizon, corresponding to short-
and long-term (Period 1and Period 2respectively). We build from a
baseline in which fully rational (unbiased) agents discount all future payo¤s
according to common a discount factor .
We consider a representative rm within a larger population of rms.
Each rm is identied with a entrepreneur/manager, denoted as M , whose
capabilities are intertwined with the rms production options. In particular,
the rms protability is associated with a project that M elects to pursue
on behalf of the rm at a cost I > 0 borne by the rm. The manager has
a choice between a short term and a long term project, as described
below.
 Short-Term Project (ST): The ST project requires the investment to be
committed from Period 0 through the end of Period 1. At maturity, the
project yields an unsuccessfulpayo¤of 0 with probability (1  q) and
a successfulpayo¤ofW > 0 with probability q: Should the rm invest
in this project, it will receive the associated payo¤ at the conclusion of
Period 1 and then liquidate, distributing proceeds to investors.
 Long-Term Project (LT): The LT project requires the same up-front
investment as ST, but remains illiquid for two periods, maturing only
at the end of Period 2. At that time, the LT project pays o¤ either
0 or V > 0, with the same probabilities as the ST project f1  q; qg.
Unlike the ST project, we suppose the LT project can come in one of
two avors goodor bad:
21As detailed above, we highlight these two contributing drivers because they seem
natural candidates with support in the literature. Many of the basic insights of our posited
framework could carry over broadly for many other behavioral drivers of managerial long-
termism and shareholder short-termism.
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 If the LT project is a good one, then a successful outcome yields
a high payo¤ of V = VH :We suppose that VH > W; and thus the
good LT project promises a higher expected present value than
ST (at least to an informed, unbiased investor).
 If the LT project is a bad one, however, then even a successful
outcome yields a payo¤ of V = VL = 0; making it clearly inferior
to ST (regardless of time preferences).
Denote  2 [0; 1] as the ex ante probability that the LT project
is a good one. With no additional information, LT constitutes a
compound lottery ex ante, yielding payo¤s f0; VHg and associated
probabilities f1  q; qg :
That said, we assume that there is additional information: prior
to her choice of project, M observes a private signal about the
LT project related to its quality. The content of this signal is de-
picted in the table below, where columns denote the true state of
the world, and rows denote the signal M observes. Each cell rep-
resents the probability that M observes the corresponding signal
conditional on the true state of the world.
V = VL = 0 V = VH
PrfBadjVig 1  z 0
PrfGoodjVig z 1
Note that Ms signal is not completely accurate, but it entails a
likelihood of false positives in which the manager (with probabil-
ity z) may observe the project to be good when in fact it is bad.
We interpret z to proxy for managerial overcondence: As the
realized value of z grows, so too does the extent of Ms (unwit-
ting) bias towards observing a good signal. We assume z is the
realized value of random variable Z; which is distributed on the
unit interval according to cumulative distribution function H (z)
and associated density function h (z) :
Player M has no wealth of her own to invest, and she must therefore
attract equity capital from outside investors. We suppose that investors
consist of a population of atomistic agents.22 All are strategic maximizers,
22Our framework does not analyze debt-nancing (at least at this stage), in order to
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but they exhibit di¤erential degrees of present bias in their time preferences,
which we capture with the - framework of quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Specically, in addition to discounting future payo¤s with common factor ,
investors also discount non-current payo¤s with an additional multiplicative
factor  2 [0; 1]. (For the time being, we assume that investors are naïve
about their bias, and they therefore predict their future selves not to be
susceptible to inter-termperal present bias23). We will periodically refer to
a realization of  for a specic investor as that investors type. Investor
types are distributed continuously within the investor population according
to a cumulative distribution function F () and associated density function
f () > 0, and total population size (
R 1
0
dF ()) is normalized at 1:
Finally, we assume that there are potential limits to arbitrage, so that
each investor can expend no more than k  d, where k proxies for individual
capital constraints. Nevertheless, investors in the aggregate posses su¢ cient
capacity to nance all projects (so that
R 1
0
k  f () d = k > I). As will
become apparent shortly, the value of k will play an important equilibrium
role in determining if (and how) asset prices reect equilibrium biases.24
3.1 Sequence
The game plays out in three stages (Stage 0; Stage 1; and Stage 3) as
follows:
Stage 0:
(a) Ms degree of overcondence (z) is realized from distribution H (z) :
At this stage, however, neither M nor potential investors are able to observe
its realized value (and M remains unaware of her realized bias throughout).
(b)M observes a signal about the quality of the LT project (more below)
and implements a business plan committing the rm to ST or LT. We assume
this signal is observable to M alone. As part of the business plan, M also
commits to a corporate governance regime at this stage, captured by the
variable  (described below).
concentrate on potential conicts between shareholders and the manager. We note, of
course, that certain forms of economic activism (e.g., to force leveraged recapitalizations)
also place shareholders and incumbent debt holders in direct conict.
23We explore the implications of allowing for sophisticatesin Section 4.
24Note that the limiting case where k ! 1 corresponds to unlimited arbitrage, and
it is also nested within in our analysis below. Note that k can also proxy increasing or
decreasing the size of the market.
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(c) After implementing a business plan, M auctions shares to investors
(who observe the business plan, but remain uninformed about both the degree
of Ms overcondence and the content of her signal). M is assumed to sell
a fraction (1  ) of the rm to outside shareholders, retaining the residual
portion  for herself. Although M is free to choose the value of ; she must
sell a su¢ cient outside stake to nance the projects investment costs of I:
Stage 1:
(a) Shareholders who have purchased in Stage 0 are able to observe the
realization z; the extent of Ms overcondence; but they remain uninformed
of Ms prior signal about project quality.25
(b) If M has embraced LT, shareholders may use the rms corporate
governance regime to e¤ectively vetoM , replacing LT with ST  what
we will call a shareholder revolt. Shareholder revolts are subject to two
constraints: First, a veto occurs only if a specied fraction  of outside
security holders vote for it. A threshold of  = 1
2
; for example, corresponds
to a majority rule, while  = 1 corresponds to a unanimity rule.26 The
variable  parameterizes a core element of shareholdersoversight rights, and
in this sense is a serviceable proxy for corporate governance. We assume (for
now) that the choice of  is like  a strategic one that M makes at Stage
0(b).27 Second, if shareholder revolt succeeds, the rm must bear switching
costs so that the ST project yields only Wc < W when successful.28 To
focus on the most interesting case, assume that Wc remains su¢ ciently large
25A straight-forward generalization of this assumption is that shareholders observe a
noisy signal of z: This ourish would add little to our analysis, however, beyond technical
complexity.
26Some statutes and case law naturally x a lower bound for  at 50% for many corporate
decisions. However, the analysis below is general enough to include the entire range from
0% to 100%. This makes some sense, given that we dene  to summarize the requisite
vote threshold for non-managerial shareholders. For many corporate decisions,Ms votes
count too, and  would represent the margin required after accounting for Ms ownership
fraction of .
Our model also allows for managerial dictatorships, impervious even to a unanimous
shareholder vote to veto. (An e¤ective dictatorship could be accomplished in any number
of ways, including inter alia dual class capital struture with control vested in M .) We
address this possibility after analyzing the more interesting case of  2 [0; 1] :
27Although we treat  as a strategic choice, it clearly may interact with either immutable
statotory or jurisprudential mandates. Later in the paper, in fact, we will explore whether
there are conditions whereby constraining Ms choice of  can ever be value-enhancing.
(Spoiler alert: Yes).
28We treat Wc as as exogenous (but it could be a relevant legal design parameter too).
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that it remains a positive net present value investment, and that switching
to ST dominates LT (even for unbiased shareholders) in the absence of more
information about LTs quality.29
(c) If the rm has embraced ST (ab initio, or by dint of a shareholder
revolt), the applicable ST payo¤ is realized and the rm liquidates. All
shareholders consume their pro rata liquidation payo¤.
Stage 2:
If M embraced LT and no shareholder revolt ensued, the LT payo¤ is
realized and the rm liquidates. All shareholders consume their pro rata
liquidation payo¤.
3.2 Solving the Model
Our crossing of strategic interactions among preference-biased players poses
a challenge for equilibrium analysis. To get a handle on it, we posit an
equilibrium concept for biased agents interacting in a game theoretic set-
ting. Our equilibrium concept essentially combines a conventional rene-
ment of sequential equilibrium (Kreps & Wilson 1982; Cho & Kreps 1987)
with the intra-personal equilibrium concept developed by ODonoghue and
Rabin (2001). Unlike the latter, we must track playersbeliefs about their
opponentslikely biases; unlike the former, we must also track playersbeliefs
and predictions about themselves. In particular, we must specify how ones
self-awareness of a behavioral bias may evolve through interactions with out-
siders (who may perceive and react to their biases). Our equilibrium concept
presumes that players make Bayesian inferences about other playersprefer-
ences and information, but they need not update their self-assessments in a
similar fashion. We will refer to this as a Bounded Temerity Equilibrium (or
B-T Equilibrium).30
Formally, a B-T Equilibrium prole consists of a set of strategies for
each player and every information set; a set of beliefs for each player about
opponentspreferences and information; a set of beliefs players have about
their own preferences; and a subjective updating rule, such that:
29This requires that qWc  max

2qVH ; I
	
:
30We have been unable to nd appropriate equilibrium concepts in the literature, leading
us to develop our own. We invite readerssuggestions about extant equilibrium concepts
that are well-suited to our set-up. (We observe that it is but a freakish coincidence that
the B-Tabbreviation corresponds with the respective rst letters of each of the authors
surnames.)
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1. All playersstrategies are optimal at each information set given their
beliefs;
2. All playersbeliefs about other players along the equilibrium path are
sequentially rational and consistent;
3. All playersbeliefs about other players o¤ the equilibrium path satisfy
the intuitive criterion31;
4. All playersbeliefs and forecasts about their own preferences are con-
sistent with a specied (potentially non-Bayesian) subjective updating
rule.
Note that the setup of our framework presumes that even though play-
ers exhibit preference biases themselves, they accurately perceive/anticipate
biases in others and update their beliefs about others in a standard way.
Our equilibrium concept also requires us to specify the playersknowledge
about their own preferences biases at each stage of the game, as well as a
rule of how they update those believes as play unfolds. This latter updating
process, in contrast, need not be Bayesian. In our baseline analysis be-
low, we impose the assumption that both managers and investors begin with
naïve beliefs about their own biases, and that those beliefs remain naïve as
play unfolds. That is, investors are aware of the distribution of managerial
overcondence (H (z)) when they bid, but that the manager believes that she
is a sober rationalist, even as those around her react to her as if she is not
(such as through a shareholder revolt). Conversely, the manager is aware of
the distribution of short-termism among investors (F ()), but investors do
not understand their own present biases, and their understanding does not
change as play unfolds.32
It will be useful to have some additional notation ready to describe the
playersbehavior strategies:
31See, e.g., Cho & Kreps (1987). The intuitive criterion is su¢ cient to generate unique
equilibria in our framework. We conjecture, however, that our equilibrium concept could
lend itself to other renements as needed.
32As noted above, other generalizations are possible. For example, following
ODonoghue & Rabin (2001), an investor of type  might predicts her future self to be
susceptible to a present bias parameter of 0 2 [; 1] : Complete naïvite corresponds with
0 = 1. Our framework naturally extends to such belief structures, which may more nat-
urally t shareholders whose present bias is induced rather than fundamental. We return
to this issue in Section 4.
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 Let  2 [0; 1] denote the probability that M opts for the LT project in
Stage 0a upon observing a Goodsignal;
 Let  2 [0; 1] denote the probability that M opts for the LT project in
Stage 0a upon observing a Badsignal;
 Let  2 [0;1) denote the equilibrium likelihood ratio of 

(an expres-
sion that appears repeatedly in the analysis below);
 Let i 2 [0; 1] denote the fraction the capital constraint invested by
investor of type  given the managers choice of business plan i; where
i 2 fST; LTg :
 Let  () 2 [0; 1] denote the probability that a shareholder of type 
will vote to support (i.e., not to veto) Ms choice in Stage 1a after M
has selected the LT project.
A B-T Equilibrium of the game thus consists of a 7-tuple strategy pro-
le

;  ; ; ; ST ; 
LT
 ; 
	
and beliefs among investors and M that satisfy
conditions 1-4. As noted above, our baseline model posits naïveté among
players about their own future biases, as well as self-assessments that re-
main unchanged even as the players observe equilibrium play. (We consider
extensions to the model to allow for sophisticatesin Section 4).
As with other equilibrium concepts, the appropriate procedure for char-
acterizing the B-T equilibrium within our framework is to solve backward,
starting at the nal stage. Because no strategic choices are made at either
the LT Project Realization Stage (Stage 2) the SH Project Realization Stage
(Stage 1c), we can commence the analysis with the shareholder veto stage for
rms that have pursued the LT project (Stage 1b). We state our interme-
diate results in a series of lemmas (Lemmas 1-6), culminating in our central
result at the end (Proposition 1).
3.2.1 Shareholder Veto Stage (Stage 1b)
Note that shareholder vetoes are (by hypothesis) inapplicable to rms em-
bracing ST project, and thus the analysis below is conned to contexts where
M has opted for the LT project. Because shareholders cannot observe the
signal observed by M; they do not possess symmetric information about the
project when they vote. At this stage they can observe only (i) that M
28
has previously selected the LT project; and (ii) the realized extent of Ms
overcondence (z).33
Given the strategy prole described above, consider how shareholders
form expectations about the projects quality when the manager has imple-
mented the long term project. There are three ways the LT project might
have been chosen. First, LT may genuinely be of high quality and M chose it
after observing a good signal (which happens with probability ). Second,
LT may be of low quality, but Ms optimism bias caused her to observe a good
signal and choose it (which happens with conjectured probability (1  ) z).
Third, LT may be of low quality and M also observed a bad signal, but she
strategically chose to pursue LT anyway (which happens with conjectured
probability (1  ) (1  z) ).
According to Bayesrule, shareholders of the LT rm formulate a proba-
bilistic assessment  that the project is good one, conditional on M having
chosen to pursue it, and the observed value of z:
 =
Pr fLT jGoodgPr fGoodg
Pr fLTg (2)
=

 + (1  ) z + (1  ) (1  z)  =

1 

1  + z +  (1  z)
Notice that when the base-rate probability of high quality () approaches one,
so too does the shareholdersassessment of ; irrespective of Ms strategic
choices. Furthermore, as z and  approach zero,  also approaches 1, since
the choice of a LT project is near-perfect signal to the market of high quality.
Intuitively, however,  is strictly decreasing in both z and , but at a decreas-
ing rate as will become clear below (since they are structural substitutes
for one another).
Given the posterior beliefs in (2), consider how the rms shareholders
will vote on whether to veto the managers business plan. If M has chosen
33The alert reader may anticipate that this structure above may give an incentive to
the entrepreneur / manager who observes a bad signal to poolwith the good manager
when selling shares. As we will see in below, for such a pooling equilibrium to exist the
badmanager must also pool with the goodmanager in the size of the share o¤ering,
keeping the residual ownership for herself. When M has observed a bad signal, the value
of this residual share is zero, and the manager will raise only enough capital to fund the
project. Consequently, pooling equilibria do not extend to this setting, as they might if,
say  were not a strategic variable. (See Lemma 3).
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a LT project, a representative shareholder will favor a veto if she perceives
the present value of the LT project no greater than the ST project (factoring
in switching costs34). This logic, in turn, yields the following equivalent
Lemmas (all proofs may be found in the Appendix):
Lemma 1a: A shareholder with present bias  supports Ms choice of LT
if z < z^ () ; where:
z^ () =

VH
Wc
  1


(1  ) (1  )

  
(1  ) (3)
Lemma 1b: A manager with overcondence level z wins support from all
shareholder types  >  (z) ; where
^ (z) =

1 +
(1  ) (z +   z)


 Wc
VH
(4)
Lemma 1a states that holding present bias xed the shareholder will
choose to support the manager when the manager is not too optimistic
(z < z^ ()). Lemma 1b states the same condition through a di¤erent lens
holding overcondence xed, a shareholder will prefer to support M when
the shareholder is su¢ ciently long-termist (i.e.,  > ^ (z)). These dual
conditions on z and ; moreover, are linear and increasing in one another,
suggesting a structural trade-o¤ between overcondence and present bias
(see Figure 2 below). Shareholder support wanes as either managers be-
come more overcondent, or as shareholders become more present-biased (or
34For simplicity, we assume that when a shareholder is indi¤erent between supporting
and vetoing, she chooses to veto. Given the continuous distribution of shareholder types,
there is no loss of generality in this assumption.
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both).
Note from the Lemmas and accompanying Figure that there is always a set of
investor preferences who favor vetoing M as a categorical matter (e.g., even
if z = 0). Indeed, the most present-biased investors completely discount all
future payo¤s (regardless of magnitude).35 Moreover, as the Figure demon-
strates, once M becomes su¢ ciently overcondent, there is no investor who
will support her, because the managers signal is simply unreliable.36 Fi-
nally, observe from the gure that as  = 

grows, the frontier separating
vetoers and supporters shifts up and to the left, and thus vetoes become pro-
gressively likely. This is intuitive, since  captures the relative frequency of
strategic to honest signals from M , and thus increases in  portend a lower
likelihood that the manager observed a good signal.
We are now in a position to characterize the outcome of the veto stage.
Suppose that in equilibrium, investors who become shareholders of the rm
have time preferences distributed according to density g () ; and associated
cumulative distribution G () : (There is no requirement that the distribution
of shareholders in equilibrium is the same as the distribution of potential
investors; will must therefore derive G () below.) Note that it is incentive
compatible for the shareholders of the rm to vote sincerely at this stage,
35To see this, note that  (0) =

1 + (1 ) 

 WcVH > 0:Whether such investors actually
become shareholders of the rm in equilibrium, of course, is another matter and one we
take up below.
36To see this, note that at z = 1;  (1) = WcVH > 1, since by hypothesis, Wc > VH :
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since the ensuing stages are mechanical and not strategic.37 Consequently,
shareholders as a group will vote to veto the manager whenever:
G

^ (z)

  , ^ (z)  G 1 ()   (5)
In other words, at a given level of managerial long-termism (z) ; a successful
shareholder revolt will occur given if the indi¤erent shareholder ^ (z) and all
those who are more impatient constitute a fraction of the rms ownership
no less than . Equivalently, a revolt will occur if the present bias of the
pivotal shareholder, ; is less than the critical cuto¤value for support, ^ (z) :
Notice that ceteris paribus, as a greater mass of short-termist shareholders
predominates at the rm, the likelihood of a veto also increases. Notice too,
however, that ceteris paribus, a veto is also more likely asMs overcondence
(z) grows in magnitude. This fundamental intuition that both investor short
termism and managerial optimism can enhance the chances of shareholder
revolts animates much of our analysis.38
37There may also be equilibria of the voting stage that entail insincerevotes by many
parties simply because the believe that they would never be the pivotal voter. For
example, the strategy prole everyone votes in to supportMmay involve insincere voting
from shareholders who would prefer to veto, but no single shareholder has an a¢ rmative
incentive to deviate. However, the sincere voting strategy is the only one robust both to
all values of  as well as to small trembling hand perturbations to others strategies.
We therefore concentrate attention to sincere voting equilibria.
38It is worth noting in passing how the time inconsistency of shareholder preferences
bears on the veto decision relative to investorsex ante evaluation of the rm. Recalling
that shareholders are assumed naive, if one were to ask a shareholder as of period 0 to
predict her voting behavior in Period 1, she would predict that her later self would favor
veto if and only if:
qWc  dx > 2qVH  dx; (6)
which simplies to the following version of Lemma 1a:
z > z (1) =

VH
Wc
  1


(1  ) (1  )

  
(1  ) (7)
Note that this condition is invariant in ; as distinguished with shareholdersactual be-
havior from (4), which turns crucially on  being above cuto¤ value of  (z): because
shareholdersshort-termism is naive, they mispredict their future inter-temporal trade-o¤s,
with all of them predicting a vote decision coinciding with rational actors. Consequently,
as of time 0, all prospective shareholders if they were sophisticated and anticipated the
time inconsistency of their preferences would gain by committing themselves to a voting
structure that ensures a veto only when the least short-termist shareholder would favor
it ( = 1). Such a structure could be accomplished, for example, by giving substantial
32
3.2.2 Share Auction Stage (Stage 0c)
We now step back yet again to Stage 0, whereM having selected a project
auctions a fraction of ownership (1  ) to investors. The share auction has
several critical attributes that are worth noting. First, recall that at this
stage shareholders are unaware of the managers degree of overcondence, and
they must evaluate their investment over the support of z. Second, because
investors are di¤erentiated from one another by their degree of present bias,
they will place di¤erential valuations on the company. The manager will
therefore nd it most protable ex ante to place as many shares as possible
in the hands of the highest valuing shareholders (i.e., those with the largest
possible values of ). Third, to the extent that there are any limits to
arbitrage (i.e., if k < 1), the manager must seek funds from investors who
have at least some present bias ( < 1). Fourth, because the marginal
investors present bias will introduce a discount on the shares, the manager
will attempt to retain as large a fraction of ownership as she can. And
nally, recall that ST and LT both require an up-front investment of I to
move forward, and thus regardless of which project M has chosen.
Analysis of these conditions yields the following two related Lemmas:
Lemma 2: For su¢ ciently slack investor access to capital ( k su¢ ciently
large), the manager will be able to raise su¢ cient outside funds to in-
vest. Regardless of the project selected by M, the equilibrium own-
ership of the rm is distributed over support  2 [; 1] according
to cumulative distribution function G () = 1   k
I
(1  F ()), where
 = F 1
 
1  I
k

. The preferences of the marginal shareholder, ,
fully determine the market valuation of the rm.
Lemma 3: There does not exist a B-T Equilibrium in which M chooses the
LT project after observing a bad signal (and thus  =  = 0).
Lemma 2 characterizes the equilibrium distribution of share ownership in
the rm. It delivers the core insight that this distribution is invariant to either
Ms project-selection choice or the prospects of a later shareholder revolt.
While perhaps surprising on rst blush, this result is intuitive: regardless of
the project selected, the most e¢ cient source capital is always the same set
governance power to the non-short-termist by (say) setting the voting threshold  = 1 (a
unanimity rule), or granting a voting proxy to the most patient of shareholders (which
e¤ectively accomplishes the same result).
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of investors: those who have the smallest degree of present bias, and who
can most e¢ ciently underwrite the required up-front investment. Indeed,
regardless of whether M opts for the ST or LT project, investors will have
to wait until a future period to realize any liquidity. And, because both
projects require an identical up-front investment of I, the set of investors
must be identical regardless of project chosen.39
The intuition underlying Lemma 3 is intertwined with Lemma 2. Because
M must accept a progressively larger discount as the size of the stock o¤ering
grows, so long asM believes the project to be a good one, she will raise only
enough to nance the project, but no more (since the manager believes the
project to be more protable than does the marginal investor). When the
manager has observed a bad signal, in contrast, she knows the project to be
bad so that V = VL = 0; she might conceivably wish to sell the entire project
to outside investors. Doing so, however, will signal to outside investors that
M has observed a bad signal, they will refuse to invest. Thus when M has
observed a bad signal but nonetheless chooses LT, she can do no better than
to pool with the manager who has observed a good signal, raising just enough
to nance the project (I) : Even if such a pooling equilibrium were possible,
the strategy would leave the bad signal avor of M with no additional
return when the project (inevitably) fails. A strictly dominant strategy
would be for M to choose ST upon observing a bad signal revealing her
information, but allowing her to raise capital and retain positive residual
rents.
Lemmas 2 and 3 simplify the analysis in two ways. First, they pin
down the precise equilibrium distribution shareholder preferences (Lemma 2),
which in turn allows us to characterize the pivotalshareholder whose vote
tips the balance in a shareholder revolt (see below). And second, they allow
us to concentrate solely on separating equilibria or partial pooling equilibria
in which  = 0 and  2 [0; 1] :
39Note that this does not imply investors place identical valuations on Ms project
choice; in general they will not, and any di¤erences will be reected both in per-share price
and the fractional dilution (1 ) that M must cede to outside investors a fraction that
is decreasing in the shareholdersexpectation of total enterprise value (analyzed below).
Note also from Lemma 2 that  is strictly increasing in k: as k grows, limits to
arbitrage slacken and it becomes progressively easier to nance the project with longer-
term investors. In the special limiting case where k ! 1; the equilibrium support of
investors converges to a mass point at  = 1; and equilibrium asset prices no longer reect
short-termism.
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Market Valuation for ST Project We now move on to analyze the
valuation that the market places on the rm in the posited equilibrium.
Consider rst the case where the manager has chosen the ST project. Here,
characterizing the markets valuation is relatively straightforward, since the
ST project choice negates the relevance of managerial overcondence (but
investor short-termism can still a¤ect valuations). Here, at stage 1, the rm
has expected value qW , which the marginal investor discounts further ex
ante , implying the following:
Lemma 4: In any B-T Equilibrium, the implied market valuation of the ST
rm is invariant in , and given by:
!ST () = !ST = 
  qW (8)
This expression establishes the total market valuation of the rm. (Note
once again that as k ! 1;  ! 1 and this market valuation converges to
the unbiased expected present value of the rm). It therefore follows that
in order to raise the requisite capital, the manager must dilute her stake by
(1  ST ) to satisfy the condition !ST (1  ST ) = I; and thus:
(1  ST ) = I
!ST
=
I
qW
(9)
Consistent with intuition, the extent of dilution is decreasing in the discount
factor () ; the probability of a successful project outcome (q) ; the payo¤
from a successful outcome (W ) ; and (via ) the nancing capacity of in-
dividual shareholders (k) : Given this degree of dilution, the expected payo¤
M expects when she pursues the ST project is:
ST  !ST

=

1  I
!ST

!ST

(10)
=
!ST   I

This payo¤ structure is very intuitive, consisting of the net present value of
the ST project (qW  !ST
 ) less the investment cost (I) inated by

1


reecting the price discount that must be granted to the marginal investor
(and reecting that investors present bias).
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Market Valuation for LT Project Now consider the case where the
manager has embraced the LT project. As we know from Lemma 3, this
case is a candidate for an equilibrium only when the manager has observed
the good signal. The complication, of course, is that here both Ms over-
condence and shareholdersshort-termist veto preferences come into play.
Moreover, potential shareholders invest knowing that they may later (in equi-
librium) stage a shareholder revolt upon observing Ms overcondence (a
contingency that feeds back on how they price LT rm). To get an appreci-
ation for how these forces interact, consider Figure 3, where the equilibrium
support of shareholders on [; 1] (per Lemma 2) is depicted on the vertical
axis, with the range of managerial overcondence depicted on the horizontal
axis. Recall that for any value of z; the shareholder types most interested in
vetoingM cluster at the low end of the shareholder support
h
; ^
i
 [; 1].
Given this ordering, it immediately follows that for any governance regime 
there exists a unique pivotalshareholder () whose vote tips the balance
in a shareholder revolt. The value of  is characterized by the following
condition:
G
 


= 1  k
I
 
1  F   =  (11)
,
 = F
 1

1  I
k
(1  )

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Accordingly, a veto will occur whenever the managers observed degree of
realized overcondence exceeds z^
 

   VHWc   1  1  ; the critical point
where M loses support from the pivotal shareholder.
At the auction stage, of course, shareholders have yet to learn the man-
agers degree of overcondence (which they discover only in Stage 1). Their
auction-stage valuation, then, can depend only of the prior distribution of
managerial overcondenceH (z), and the fact that the manager has opted for
LT. This is su¢ cient to permit investors to formulate (i) Bayesian posteriors
about managerial overcondence given the project choice, (ii) expectations
about the likelihood of a later shareholder revolt, and (iii) the expected con-
sequences that would ensue therefrom. Analysis of these considerations in
relation to the marginal investors valuation of the LT rm generates the
next (important) Lemma:
Lemma 5: In any B-T Equilibrium, the implied market valuation of the LT
rm is given by:
!LT () = 
qWc 


1 +(

1  )

VH Wc
Wc

H(z^)+E(zjzz^)(1 H(z^))

1 +E(z)

(12)
For all k < 1, moreover, !LT () is strictly increasing in  2 [0; 1] ;
and is maximized by corporate governance regime  = 1, requiring a
unanimous vote to veto M: Under such a rule, the rms implied market
valuation is:
!LT (1) = 
qWc 

( 1  )+E

max
n
z;( 1  )

VH Wc
Wc
o

1 +E(z)

(13)
Lemma 5 delivers two results that are helpful in characterizing the B-
T Equilibrium of the game. First, it gives an expression for the market
valuation of the LT rm. Although admittedly complex, the expression in
(12) essentially consists of a baseline value equal to the marginal shareholders
valuation of the rm if a revolt were certain (i.e., qWc) times a multiplier
that never smaller (and is generally strictly larger) than one. Note from both
expressions (12) and (13) that the multiplier contains an option-like payo¤ in
z; the managers level of optimism. This component reects the value of the
real optionshareholders of the LT rm have to vetoMs business plan after
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observing z. And, as with other options, its value tends to grow as does
the market value of the LT project when one increases the variability on z:
Given this valuation, one can immediately deduce the fraction by which the
manager of the LT rm must dilute her stake to procure nancing:
(1  LT ) = I
!LT ()
(14)
We will return to this expression below.
Second, Lemma 5 states that the implied market valuation of the rm at
the auction stage is strictly increasing in , and is uniquely maximized by a
unanimity rule ( = 1). This may seem surprising on rst blush, but it makes
clear intuitive sense when one considers the role of time-inconsistent, investor
short-termism in assessing the prospects for a revolt. For any value  < 1; the
pivotal shareholder will manifests short termism ( < 1), and accordingly
there exist a range of realizations on z that induce a shareholder revolt even
though retaining the LT project would generate a larger continuation value.
Although each individual shareholder fails to realize her own susceptibility to
short termism, she is rational about other shareholdersbiases, and recognizes
that a  < 1 rule may result in ine¢ cient vetoes. When  = 1; in contrast,
the pivotal shareholder is unbiased ( = 1), and no ine¢ cient vetoes occur.
Indeed, from their ex ante perspective, all shareholders individually believe
that they will manifest no short-termism in Period 1, and they therefore
(erroneously) consider the  = 1 rule to be a perfect match for their future
preferences.
3.2.3 Project Choice Stage (Stage 0b)
We now step back once again to the project choice stage, in the light of the
strategic dynamics noted above. The manager anticipates the posterior be-
liefs that her choice of will induce among investors (wrongly, in Ms opinion).
She also anticipates the equilibrium distribution of shareholder preferences,
the equilibrium likelihood of a shareholder revolt, the market valuation from
each project, and the degree of dilution she must incur to nance each project
choice. Combining these pieces of information, M will assess the conditions
under which her choice of the LT project is attractive to her and resilient
against shareholder revolt.
38
Lemma 6: In any B-T Equilibrium, the manager always opts for the ST
project after receiving a bad signal. After receiving a good signal, M
will opt for LT project only if  > ^, where:
^ Max

0; 1  k
I

1  F

Wc
VH

(15)
Lemma 6 gives a necessary condition for the manager to pursue the LT
project after a good signal. It reects the strategic consideration that M
will only pursue the LT project only if she believes that shareholders wont
veto her. Because M remains oblivious to her own overcondence, however,
she is certain that shareholders will later observe her to be perfectly rational
(z = 0). Thus, from the managers perspective, shareholders will revolt
against her only if the pivotal shareholder would systematically oppose any
manager, regardless of overcondence. The critical value of  given in the
Lemma is the governance regime at which short-termist shareholders would
veto even a fully rational manager (which M believes herself to be).
It is of course important to note that the value of  2 [0; 1] is assumed
to be a strategic choice for M . Consequently, Lemma 6 need not bind Ms
behavior because it is always possible to choose  > : Indeed, as we will
see below, M prefers setting  = 1; since that ensures the highest market val-
uation of the project (per Lemma 5), minimizes the required dilution (also
per Lemma 5), and entails the smallest chance of a shareholder revolt. Note
also that even when M chooses  = 1; the condition stated in Lemma 6 is
necessary, but it is not su¢ cient to attractM to the LT project after observ-
ing a good signal. Because investors anticipate Ms overcondence, they
may demand a substantially larger dilution to invest in the LT project; con-
sequently, M may be better o¤ pursuing ST, where the equilibrium dilution
may be smaller.
3.2.4 B-T Equilibrium
With Lemmas 1-6 in hand, we are now in position to aggregate them and
characterize the B-T Equilibrium for the model. This characterization is
reected in our central result, stated below as Proposition 1.
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Proposition 1: Suppose investors and managers are naïve about their present
biases and overcondence (respectively), and that they do not update
their self assessments. The B-T Equilibria40 of the game depend on
investorscapital constraint k, and are as follows:
k < k k = k k > k
 0  2 [0; 1] 1
 0 0 0
 N=A 1 1
 1  I=!ST

1  I=!ST if ST
1  I=!LT (1) if LT 1  I=!LT (1)
ST

1 if   
0 else

1 if   
0 else

1 if   
0 else
LT

1 if   
0 else

1 if   
0 else

1 if   
0 else
 N=A
8<:
N=A if ST
1 if LT &   
0 else

1 if   
0 else
where !ST ; !LT (1) ; 
; and  are as dened above, and k
 is given
by:
k  I
1  F

I
q(VH W ) 

E(z)  Wc
VH
E

max
n
z ( 1  )

VH Wc
Wc

;0
o

1 +
Wc
VH
E

max
n
z ( 1  )

VH Wc
Wc

;0
o

(16)
Although Proposition 1 predominantly aggregates the results from Lem-
mas 1 - 6, it contains a few additional insights. In particular, the Proposition
states thatMs proclivity to pursue the LT project after a good signal hinges
critically on limits to arbitrage (reected through capital constraint k). This
is because, as noted above, k is inversely related to the role that present bias
40The belief structures supporting the stated strategy prole are easy and intuitive, and
we therefore omit lsting them to economize on space. The only small caveat concerns
equilibrium beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path, when k < k but the manager nonetheless
selects LT. Here, one set of beliefs that su¢ ces under the intuitive criterion (per Cho &
Kreps 1987) is that investors place probability 1 on the manager having observed a bad
signal.
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plays in equilibrium pricing: When k is large, equilibrium ownership is vested
in relatively patient investors who are less susceptible to present bias (i.e., 
is large). As k shrinks, however, M must sell deeperinto the population
of potential investors, drawing in a marginal shareholder who grows increas-
ingly present biased (and  shrinks). This turns out to impose a larger
incremental penalty in equilibrium on the LT project (where investorsgrow-
ing present biases amplify the Bayesian discount they already demand for
overcondence) than it has on the ST project (where overcondence is im-
material). Eventually (once k < k); the manager becomes categorically
uninterested in LT. The di¤erential e¤ect that k has on Ms project choice
has intriguing policy implications which we take up in the next section.
Note that for the most part, Proposition 1 identies a unique B-T Equilib-
rium prole; the only exception is the knife-edge case where k = k; in which
case M is indi¤erent between ST and LT and is willing to play any mixed
strategy. Even there, however, once the outcome of this mixed-strategy
choice is realized, the remainder proceeds in pure strategies matching one of
the other cases.
Finally consider the parametric ingredients of k given expression (16)
from Proposition 1. Although its functional form is somewhat intricate, a
few aspects stand out. The value of k is strictly increasing in the required
up-front investment for either project (I). This is intuitive, since a larger
up-front investment increases the stakes for shareholders, reducing their will-
ingness to bear the risk of overcondence in the LT project. Similarly, as
the payo¤ associated with the ST project (W ) increases, k grows and both
shareholders and M become more attracted to the ST project. Note also
that just as with !LT ; embedded within k is an call-option-like payo¤on z;
the managers level of optimism (relative to a strike price of
 

1 
 
VH Wc
Wc

).
This payo¤reects the shareholdersreal option to veto a managerial decision
to pursue the LT project. And, like other call options, this one becomes more
valuable as z becomes more variable. Accordingly, k tends to shrink and
the LT project grows easier to support in equilibrium when one increases
the variability on z:
4 Discussion, Implications and Extensions
Several concomitants of Proposition 1 (and its supporting Lemmas) have
interesting policy implications for the activism debate, and we highlight some
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of them in this section. In addition, we consider various possible extensions
to the model, o¤ering conjectures about whether/how they would change our
central results. Finally, we o¤er some tentative hypotheses about how to
test and/or calibrate our theory with real-world data.
4.1 Policy Implications
Our central result carries interesting implications for ongoing legal and policy
debates over activism and short-termism. We consider several of them below,
through a series of corollaries.
Corollary 1: When k < k, short-termism is so pervasive in equilibrium
that managers categorically eschew the LT project (even when LT is
value maximizing), and shareholder revolts do not occur in equilibrium.
Corollary 1, which is a direct implication of Proposition 1, bears some
resemblance to the common allegation (e.g., Lipton 2015) that the threat
of activism browbeats managers into eschewing long-term investments writ
large. It thus has obvious relevance for the activism debate in contexts where
limits to arbitrage bind. For example, if k < k across all rms, then we
would expect managers systematically to embrace short-term projects. A
manager who makes a mistakenly embraces LT (i.e., o¤ the equilibrium
path) would eventually be vetoed and compelled to rejoin the remainder
who have embraced the ST project (incurring a switching cost along the
way). Over the medium to long term, however, we would expect such a rm
to earn returns comparable to other ST rms. (Cf. Bebchuk et al 2015).
It is important to note that when the predicate conditions of Corollary 1
hold, shareholder revolts should not occur at all in our models equilibrium
(or, in practical terms, they would be exceedingly rare). That one observes
them frequently in practice, then, casts some doubt on the condition stated
in Corollary 1 at least insofar as k takes on a common value across all
rms.
Corollary 2: When k  k; shareholder revolts occur in equilibrium with
positive probability, and they systematically target the most overcon-
dent managers, leaving less biased managers unscathed. Nevertheless,
when k < 1 and  < 1; shareholder revolts are also overinclusive,
targeting some long-term projects whose continuation would be value
maximizing.
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Corollary 2 states that even when k  k; equilibrium behavior is a
mixed bag on e¢ ciency grounds. On the one hand, while managers have
the gumption to opt for LT upon receiving a good signal, they tend to be
overly smitten with such projects, and their unwarranted attraction to LT
grows in the degree of their overcondence. Consequently, overcondent
managers will be highly over-represented within rms embracing long-term
projects. It is therefore unsurprising that equilibrium shareholder revolts
target the most overcondent of these managers (in terms of our model,
those for whom z  z^ = 1  
 
VH=Wc   1

).
That said, shareholder revolts can also jump the gun, deposing even
managers who have embraced value-maximizing long-term strategies. Within
our model, gun-jumping occurs generically unless either k =1 or  = 1 (or
both). Outside of these extreme cases, the equilibrium marginal purchaser
exhibits present-biases (i:e:;  < 1) ; as does the pivotal shareholder hold-
ing the swing vote in a revolt (i:e:;  2 (; 1) < 1). Consequently, the
pivotal shareholder will be biased towards the immediate payo¤ associated
with reverting to the short term project. This e¤ect disappears only when
the pivotal shareholder is unbiased which happens in our model when ei-
ther (i) capital constraints do not bind (k =1) ; or (ii) the governance rule
requires unanimity, vesting decisional control in the unbiased shareholder 
 =  = 1

: Of course, if the manager has complete control over ; she
can x  = 1 and eliminate the gun-jumping problem. In some contexts,
however, M may not be free to do so (a topic we return to below).
Corollary 3: When k < 1 and  > 0, a rm experiencing a shareholder
revolt experiences a discontinuous upward jump in its market valua-
tion, which need not reect market fundamentals, but rather to the
time-inconsistency of the marginal investors present bias. Moreover,
this upward discontinuity can occur even when the shareholder revolt
destroys value.
Corollary 3 reects a phenomenon that is common to many behavioral
economics models with time-inconsistent preferences: As time transitions
forward, time preferences shift too (and rankings can invert). In our model
at the ex ante stage, present-biased shareholders trade o¤ the payo¤s from
ST and LT relatively even-handedly, because both projects promise payo¤s
that obtain at least a period into the future. Once Stage 1 obtains, how-
ever, present-biased shareholders remove their discount on the ST project
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(which pays o¤ immediately) while retaining it in the LT project. The
pivotal shareholder
 


will precipitate a revolt when and only when her
perceived valuation of staying with LT (or   [q  VH   (z^)]) is just o¤set
by her perceived valuation of an immediate payo¤ from reverting to ST (or
q Wc); and consequently M is deposed only when z  z^: However, it is the
marginal investor () not the pivotal shareholder
 


 who determines
equilibrium prices; and the former is, by construction, more present-biased
than the later
 
 < 

.
To better understand the intuition behind Corollary 3, consider two hy-
pothetical rms A and B, whose managers manifest overcondence in the
degrees zA = z^ + " and zB = z^   "; where " is innitesimally small. Note
that these rms are just on opposite sides of the demarcation line presaging
a shareholder revolt: one occurs with rm A, but not with rm B: Never-
theless, because " is small, the pivotal shareholder (by hypothesis) values the
two rms approximately equally.
Market valuations tell another story: When zA is revealed, equilibrium
prices will adjust to reect the marginal investors valuation of the inevitable
revolt and ensuing reversion to ST: this amount is once again qWc. When zB
is revealed, prices also adjust, now to reect the marginal investors valuation
of maintaining the status quo, given zB: this amount is 
[q  VH   (zB)] :
Because  < ; this latter amount will reect a discount of Firm B (the one
that survives a revolt) relative to Firm A (the one that succumbs). Conse-
quently, Firm A will begin to trade at a premium over Firm B, since pricing
is determined by the most biased shareholder in equilibrium, : By this
same logic, it becomes immediately clear that whenever  < 1; the even the
pivotal shareholder will exhibit present bias ( < 1), and her preference
for revolting against Firm A will be ine¢ cient; and yet the revolt induces
a positive abnormal return for Firm A relative to Firm B (where the revolt
fails, e¢ ciently).
This result has obvious implications for understanding the relationship
between price movements and activism. As has been well documented,
activism generally results in positive abnormal returns  a result that ap-
pears to be robust in the literature (e.g., Krishan, Parnoy & Thomas 2015).
Corollary 3 suggests that while such measures may be the markers of value
creation (and it seems to us that they are in many instances), they can also
reect time-inconsistent pricing paths that do not bear signicantly on value
creation.
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Corollary 4: When k  k and the decision rule governing shareholder
revolts is e¢ cient ex post, managers in equilibrium are ine¢ ciently
attracted to long-term projects at the ex ante stage.
This result identies a central e¢ ciency tension in our model between
static and dynamic e¢ ciency. As Corollary 2 demonstrated, it is possible
to implement an e¢ cient corporate governance regime at the interim stage
if either (i) capital constraints do not bind (k =1) or (ii) the governance
system vests control in unbiased shareholders ( = 1). Corollary 4 states
that in either case, an ex ante ine¢ ciency remains in our model: managers
are systematically smitten with the LT project and  by dint of their over-
condence  they too frequently embrace such projects even the actuarial
shadow of a subsequent veto threat (and ensuing switching costs to revert
to ST). Interestingly, if the prospect of a later veto were more greater (even
due to an ine¢ cient governance rule), the threat could neutralize Ms over-
condent attraction to LT.41 This static-dynamic trade-o¤ is captured in
Corollary 5.
Corollary 5: In the presence of both managerial overcondence and investor
present bias, a decision rule that induces some ine¢ cient shareholder
revolts ex post (  < 1) can deter some overcondent managers from in-
e¢ ciently committing the rm to ine¢ cient long-term projects ex ante.
Corollary 5 states an intriguing implication of our main result: that
managerial overcondence and shareholder present-bias while both value-
eroding in isolation may counteract one another when mutually present.
As explored in Lemma 5, setting  = 1 maximizes the market value of the LT
rm conditional on the choice of project. However, Corollary 4 teaches that
this value maximally exacerbates the managers tendency to favor long-term
projects. If the managers choice of  were constrained to an upper bound
whereby    < 1; then in equilibrium the pivotal shareholder would be-
come more present biased and the probability of a shareholder revolt would
41In fact, it is worth observing that Ms overcondence may do double duty in creating
this ex ante ine¢ ciency: not only does overcondence cause her to be overly attracted to
LT, but her very overcondence leads M to embrace the e¢ cient decision rule, presuming
that an unbiased shareholder will support her in the event of a shareholder revolt. She
therefore vests the pivotal vote in the unbiased equilibrium shareholder ( = 1) ; who
proceeds (probabilistically) to turn on M through a shareholder revolt when it is later
revealed that M was unduly optimistic.
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increase, reducing Ms payo¤ from the LT project. In fact, if one were cer-
tain ab initio that LT was value-destroying, then any   ^ (see Lemma 6)
would e¤ectively compel the manager to opt for ST (e¢ ciently).
Although the Corollary highlights constraints on governance, similar rea-
soning could apply to other policy manipulations that would tend to move
the pivotal vote further into the hands of a short-termist shareholder. For
example, along with limiting ; one could also constrain investorscapital
constraint below some prescribed value k; which would similarly vest more
decision-making authority in the hands of present-biased investors. Al-
ternatively, courts might grant their imprimatur under duciary duty law
for director-nominees of shorter-horizon investors to privilege their own con-
stituencys best interests in corporate deliberations  a topic that remains
unsettled.42
We hasten to add that we do view Corollary 5 as an open invitation to
policy makers to engineerpresent-bias into equilibrium prices even in a
well intentioned e¤ort to balance static ine¢ ciencies against dynamic ones.
The precise trade-o¤ turns on heterogeneous and di¢ cult-to-observe char-
acteristics, and it is plausibly model specic. Moreover, even if one could
eliminate model uncertainty, the deliberate exacerbation of behavioral biases
would still impose a valuation discount on all rms a discount that could
deter entrepreneurship writ large. By the same token, however, Corollary 5
also calls into question the reverse strategy (plausibly also well intentioned) of
attempting to engineer short termism completely out of the picture, irrespec-
tive of whether it serves an important role in counterbalancing managerial
long termism. (And vice versa.) At the very least, one would rst want
to determine whether short termism and long termism are likely to inter-
act as an empirical matter, and under what circumstances. To the extent
that overcondence and present biases are coextensive (or are matched), an
appropriate policy response may be simply to leave well enough alone. More-
over, to the extent that these phenomena tend to mutually exclusive (or are
mismatched), an appropriate response still would likely be context-specic,
not monolithic or categorical. (We return to this point below.)
42That said, prominent Delaware judges seem to have staked out an inconsistent course.
See, e.g., Laster & Zeberkiewicz (2015), at 49 (arguing that all directorsduciary duties
should be that of maximiz[ing] the value of the corporation over the long term for the
benet of the providers of long-term (i.e., presumptively permanent) capital).
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4.2 Extensions and Empirical Implications
Our analysis has concentrated on a baseline formulation of our model. From
it, we have generated several insights that are of potential policy signicance.
Whether their signicance is more than potential, however, depends on the
robustness of these insights, both theoretically and empirically. We address
each briey in turn.
Our baseline model assumed complete naïveté on both shareholdersand
the managers perspectives. Neither group was able to forecast their future
preference biases, nor were they inclined to update their own self-assessment
as equilibrium play transpired. An obvious set of extensions to our frame-
work would be to allow greater sophisticationof the parties in a variety of
ways. From the investor side, one might allow investors of type  to fore-
cast their future selves to manifest hyperbolic parameter 0 2 [; 1] : This
formulation (ODonoghue & Rabin 2001) e¤ectively parameterizes sophisti-
cation, so that 0 = 1 corresponds to utter naïveté and 0 = 0 corresponds
to complete sophistication. When a present bias is due to cognitive factors,
this form of sophistication typically implies that investors will understand
that their future self may make undesirable decisions (from their ex ante
perspective). Consequently, sophisticates are attracted to mechanisms that
commit them to a course of conduct favored under their ex ante preferences
(even if disfavored under their ex post preferences). Such an extension is
easily accommodated in our model. In fact, it turns out that  somewhat
surprisingly  all our central results remain fully intact as stated, for any
value of 0 2 [; 1]. To see why, recall from Proposition 1 that even when
paired with completely naïve investors, the manager strategically chooses a
unanimity governance structure, where  = 1: Investors readily accepted this
structure, since it vested authority over a shareholder revolt in a non-present
biased decision maker  which they naïvely believed they would be at Stage
1. This ex-post decision rule, however, is exactly the same one that a
sophisticate would utilize to bind their future selves; essentially, the strate-
gic incentives of the manager already induce equilibria that tie the hands of
investors in precisely the same way as sophisticates would prefer.
This same logic need not carry over to sophisticates whose present biases
are induced by incentive structures (rather than organic). When these in-
vestors (accurately) predict their future induced bias, they internalize those
payo¤s rather than endeavoring to bind their future selves with an e¢ cient
decision rule ( = 1). Indeed, from their perspective even ex ante, such a
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governance rule unduly dampens the abandonment of the LT project. Ac-
cordingly, the induced-present-biased sophisticate (including marginal share-
holder ) more steeply discounts shares of a company adopting a unanimity
or supermajority regime (relative to her naïve counterpart), requiring greater
price dilution at the IPO stage. This discount, in turn, requires M to set
 in a manner that trades o¤ this dilution against the loss that M perceives
to be incurred by ine¢ cient shareholder revolts. Per Corollary 4, this reac-
tion could deter overcondent managers from ine¢ ciently pursuing the LT
project. Alternatively, in cases where that perceived loss would be extreme,
the manager may simply choose to accept the discount and insulate herself
completely through a dictatorial governance structure (such as dual-class
capitalizations).
One could also extend the model allow varying degrees of managerial so-
phistication. In our baseline model, the manager is similarly naïve about
her susceptibility towards overcondence, and she does not update that as-
sessment even as shareholders begin to observe (and react to) her bias. A
more sophisticated manager may be more self-aware, placing less condence
in her own self assessment, and more condence in shareholder reactions to
true up her beliefs. Such a manager may not only be more willing to entrust
the veto decision to unbiased shareholders, but also more conservative about
pursuing the LT project after a good signal, discounting that signal in the
same way shareholders would at the pricing stage.
Empirically, our results suggest that e¢ ciency-minded policy makers as-
piring to intervene in the activism debate would be wise to assess whether
(and how) overcondence and present bias interact in practice. As noted
above, when the two phenomena are both present, they can have counter-
balancing e¤ects, and an appropriate regulatory response may lean towards
the laissez-faire. However, when overcondence and present bias tend to
occur in isolation, it could make sense to tailor regulatory/judicial policy,
placing a thumb on the scale favoring activists in some contexts and favoring
managers in others. This is clearly an empirical question that is largely be-
yond the scope of the current paper, but is the focus of a companion project
to this one. (Indeed, a principal goal of this paper is to tease out  in a
manner more disciplined than seat-of-the-pants conjecture intuitions that
lend themselves to empirical calibration / testing.) Although we reserve
the balance of that analysis for another day, one potential strategy might be
to focus on established proxies for managerial overcondence and investor
present bias, exploring their empirical relationship (1) with one another, as
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well as (2) with realized episodes of shareholder activism. If overcondence
and present bias are statistical complements, we would expect that in equi-
librium, they would be positively correlated both with one another and with
observed activism engagements. If they are statistical substitutes, in con-
trast, we would not expect to observe a positive correlation between them
in equilibrium, nor would we expect both to be positively correlated with
activism engagements. We hope to pursue these issues in future work.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have drawn inspiration from emerging literatures on man-
agerial overcondence and investor present bias to develop and analyze a
theoretical model interacting these e¤ects (in di¤erential degrees) within a
capital market / corporate governance setting. The equilibria generated by
our model bear a striking resemblance to many of the characteristics of the
heated debate currently embroiling the relative merits of hedge fund activism
in public companies. Moreover, our framework has generated both prescrip-
tive and empirical implications for this debate, many of which we plan to
pursue in future work (and invite others to do the same). We remain mind-
ful that our analysis comes nowhere close to putting this debate to rest. To
the contrary: even judged on their own terms, our models implications re-
main tethered to several empirical questions that (to our knowledge) remain
unaswered. That said, we believe that such questions are both relevant
and answerable, and that due consideration of them deserves a seat at the
prescriptive table.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemmas 1a and 1b: Consider a shareholder of type  holding
fraction dx of the rm after M has chosen LT. This shareholder will favor
vetoing M whenever her expected ownership stake from abandoning the project
exceeds her expected payo¤ (equilibrium) from deferring, or:
qVH  dx < qWc  dx (17)
Substituting the functional form of  and solving for z and  (respectively)
yields the result in the text.
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose rst that M has opted for the ST project; a
potential investor of type  would assess the following valuation on the entire
company:
!ST =   qW (18)
Suppose alternatively that M has opted for the LT project, and potential
investors anticipate that the project will be vetoed with equilibrium probability
 (z) : The potential investor of type  would assess the following valuation
on enterprise:
!LT = EZ f  q ( (z)Wc + (1   (z)) VH   (z))g (19)
   qWc (20)
Note that the expressions for !ST and !LT in (18) and (19) are su¢ ciently
large that both represent expected payo¤s in excess of the investment cost (I)
for at least some range of potential shareholders. Consequently, so long as
investment capacity of investors (reected by k) is large enough, it will be
possible to nance the project. Second, note that M has an incentive to sell
to the highest valuing investors, who will pay the most (on a per share basis)
for their stake. Consequently, it follows that those who purchase will exhaust
their purchasing constraint limit (of k), buying as many fractional shares
as possible. Accordingly, the highest valuing investors who purchase must
consist of an interval from [; 1], who contribute total revenues of:Z 1

(k) f () d = k  (1  F ()) : (21)
Because the marginal shareholder is of type , the market must assess an
equilibrium value on the entire company of Vi (the marginal shareholders
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valuation), implying a total valuation of the public o¤ering of:
(1  )  !i; (22)
for i 2 fST; LTg. Equilibrium further requires that the marginal bidder be
willing to purchase, so that total auction revenues must be weakly less than
the bidders valuation:
k  (1  F ())  (1  )  !i (23)
The manager thus wants to choose  to maximize his expected payo¤ subject
to the constraints that he must (a) raise su¢ cient capital to make the invest-
ment and (b) that the auction must clear. Whenever  < 1, it is clear that
M would prefer to set  as small as possible regardless of the project chosen,
because investors discount all future payo¤s excessively (from Ms perspec-
tive). Even when  = 1 (the limiting case when k !1), M weakly prefers
setting as small as possible after choosing the LT project, since all potential
shareholders are no more condent about the LT project than is M. Imposing
this condition implies that (23) must bind at equality, which in turn implies:
(1  ) = k (1  F (
))
!i
 (24)
Finally, it must be the case that the total amount raised is also equal to the
investment requirement I :
I = (1  )  !i (25)
=

k (1  F ())
!i


 !i
, F () = 1  I
k
< 1;
which identies the value of  uniquely as that given in the lemma:
 = F 1

1  I
k

(26)
The cumulative distribution of shareholders will correspond to the right tail
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of F (j  ) ; or:
G () = F (j  ) (27)
=
F ()  F ()
1  F ()
=
F ()   1  I
k
 
I
k
 (28)
=

1  k
I
(1  F ()) if  2 [; 1]
0 else
which is the expression stated in the Lemma.
Proof of Lemmas 3 & 4: Follow directly from discussion in text.
Proof of Lemma 5: From Lemma 3, we know that  =  = 0; and thus
if M has opted for LT, it must be because she observed a good signal. That
said, the likelihood that the manager has observed a good signal is increasing
in managerial overcondence ( z). In formulating their respective valuations
of the LT rm, then, investors will assess a posterior probability density on
the managers degree of overcondence, conditional on having selected the LT
project.
h (zjLT ) = Pr fLT jzg
Pr fLTg h (z) (29)
=
 + (1  ) zR 1
0
( + (1  ) z)h (z) dz  h (z)
=

1  + z

1  + E (z)
 h (z)
Note that this posterior density places greater mass on the managers over-
condence than the unconditional density h (z).
Shareholders thus know that a veto will ensue M if they observe z 
z^; which occurs with probability
R 1
z^
h (zjLT ) dz = 1  H (z^jLT ) ; and they
will consequently receive a payo¤ from the ensuing reversion to ST, which
represents an ex ante value to the marginal shareholder  of:
  q Wc (30)
In contrast, shareholders will support M if z < z^; which occurs with
probability H (z^jLT ), and they will receive the continuation payo¤ from stay-
ing with LT, which represents an ex ante value to the marginal shareholder
 of:
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2  qVH  E (jz < z^;LT ) (31)
where
E (jz < z;LT ) =
Z z^
0
 

(1 )

(1 ) + z
!
h (zjLT )
H (z^jLT )dz (32)
=
Z z^
0

(1 )

1  + E (z)
h (z)
H (z^jLT )dz
=

(1 )

1  + E (z)
H (z^)
H (z^jLT )
Assembling each of these components gives rise to the implied market valua-
tion of the LT rm for a given value of :
!LT () = [1 H (z^jLT )]    qWc (33)
+H (z^jLT )  2  qVH  E (jz < z^;LT )
= [1 H (z^jLT )]    qWc
+H (z^jLT )  2  qVH 
 

(1 )

1  + E (z)
H (z^)
H (z^jLT )
!
=
"Z 1
z^

1  + z

1  + E (z)
 h (z) dz
#
   qWc
+
Z z^
0
h (z) dz

 2  qVH 
 

(1 )

1  + E (z)
!
=
  q

1  + E (z)
 
Wc 
 

1 
  R 1
z^
h (z) dz
+Wc 
R 1
z^
zh (z) dz + VH 
 

1 
  R z^
0
h (z) dz
!
=
  q

1  + E (z)
Wc 
  

1 

+

VH Wc
Wc

   
1 
 H (z^)
+E (zjz  z^)  (1 H (z^))
!
which is the expression given in expression (12) of the Lemma.
To show that the optimal governance structure is given by  = 1; recall
that there is a one-to-one relationship between ;  and z^; and consider the
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optimal choice of z^. Di¤erentiating !LT with respect to z yields:
@!LT
@z^
= 
qWc

1 +E(z)
 
VH Wc
Wc
  

1 
  @
@z^
H (z^) +
@
@z^
Z 1
z^
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Note that the multiplicative term outside the square brackets is strictly posi-
tive, but the term inside the square brackets changes from positive to negative
at z^ =

VH Wc
Wc
  

1 

; signifying a maximum. Substituting in the deni-
tion of z^ yields:
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This expression is uniquely satised at  = 1 for any nite value of k: In
the limiting case where there are no capital constraints bind and k !1; the
expression is satised for all values of : Imposing z^1 =

VH Wc
Wc
  

1 

on
(12) and then rearranging yields expression (13)
Proof of Lemma 6. If M pursues ST, then as noted above she will incur
dilution equal to (1  ST ) = I!ST ; culminating in an expected net payo¤ of
ST  !ST = !ST I : If she pursues LT after a good signal, in contrast, she
will incur dilution of (1  ST ) = I!ST () : Ms expected payo¤ net payo¤
from LT is somewhat more complicated, because an overcondent M values
LT more highly than even the least biased shareholder. Indeed, in a B-T
Equilibrium, the manager dismisses the possibility that she is receiving an
inaccurate signal, and she instead presumes her signal to be perfectly precise.
Moreover, she is certain that when shareholders later observe her degree of
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overcondence, they will discover that she is perfectly rational ( z = 0). Thus,
from the managers perspective, shareholders will revolt against her only if the
pivotal shareholder () would systematically oppose any manager, regardless
of overcondence. This would happen only if and only if:
  ^ (0) =
Wc
VH
(37)
   Max

0; 1  k
I

1  F

Wc
VH

< 1
This is the condition stated in the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1: All of the Proposition follows immediately
from Lemmas 1-6, save the condition on k and the optimality for M of
setting  = 1 for the LT project. Beginning with the latter, suppose not and
that the optimal governance of the LT project from Ms perspective were at
 < 1: From Lemma 5, we know that this corresponds to a value of z^ <
VH Wc
Wc
  

1 

: However, by increasing z^; (34) implies that the market
value of LT will increase, resulting in a smaller dilution per expression (),
and (because  = 1 > ^) a lower perceived probability of a shareholder veto.
This implies a contradiction.
To show the condition on k; we rst x  = 1; which is its optimal
value from Ms perspective. At this point, M believes (wrongly) that her
preferences are perfectly aligned with the type  = 1 investor, and she will
never be vetoed. Consequently Ms perceived payo¤ at this stage consists of
(i) the payo¤ she anticipates of the LT project (conditional on a good signal),
discounted by (ii) the market dilution M must accept to nance the project.
The managers expected net payo¤ is thus:
LT 2qVH =
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1  I
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
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=
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(38)
And thus, assuming M sets  = 1; M will select the LT if and only if:
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which is the expression given in the Proposition.
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8 Post-Closing-Credits Shawarma43
As discussed in Section 5, several prescriptive implications of our analysis
turn on identifying whether managerial short-termism and investor present-
bias tend to occur in isolation or in conjunction. To the extent it is the
latter, they can plausibly dampen each otherse¤ects without an extra boost
from legal policy (Corollary 5). On the other hand, if the biases tend to be
negatively related, appropriately calibrated legal / regulatory interventions
can potentially help to address ine¢ cient long-termism or ine¢ cient short-
termism. One strategy for exploring this question focuses on analyzing
available proxies for managerial overcondence and investor present bias, and
exploring their empirical relationship (1) with one another, as well as (2) with
realized episodes of shareholder activism. If overcondence and present bias
are statistical complements, we would expect that in equilibrium, they would
be positively correlated with one another as well as with observed activism
engagements. If they are statistical substitutes, we would not expect to
observe a positive correlation between them in equilibrium, nor would we
expect both to be positively correlated with activism engagements.
A tentative analytic sortie along these lines is reected in Tables A1 and
A2, which explore a part of the diagnostic proposition stated above. The
tables summarize (A1) and then analyze in a series of regressions (A2) an un-
balanced panel spanning the years 1999-2015, in which we merge Compustat
data, 13D ling data (from AuditAnalytics), and one recently-developed met-
ric of managerial overcondence due to Sen & Tumarkin (2015). Their over-
condence metric (Share_Retainer) is a dummy variable indicating whether
a CEO retained a any stock from her exercised options (versus immediately
selling) in a given year. The three-way merge allows us to match the Sen
& Tumarkin (2015) data with nancial controls (including assets, revenues,
ROA, and R&D expenditures), as well as Schedule 13D lings. We con-
sider four left-hand-side measures of activism44: (a) Whether the issuer had
any 13D lings during the rm-year (Filed13D_Any); (b) How many 13Ds
were led during the rm-year (Filed13D_Total); (c) Whether the issuer
had any 13D lings during the rm-year where the ler specically discloses
disagreement with / criticism of management or manifests a hostile intent
43See https://youtu.be/EYiZeszLosE. We include this coda to outline some preliminary
thoughts (for a follow-on project) related to the empirical implications of our argument.
44We count amended lings as separate lings, which plausibly captures the intensity
of an egagement; of course, there can be some reasons to exclude amended lings as well.
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to e¤ect control (ActivistTag_Any); and (d) How many 13D lings occurred
during the rm-year where the ler specically discloses disagreement with
/ criticism of management or manifests an intent to e¤ect control (Activist-
Tag_Total).
Results from a (very) preliminary set of regressions are reproduced in
Table A2, both without and with nancial controls.45 The Table reports
the estimated coe¢ cients of xed-e¤ect linear probability specications for
Filed13D_Any and ActivistTag_Any, and of conditional xed-e¤ect negative
binomial specications for Filed13D_Total and ActivistTag_Total.46 These
results suggest of a negative statistical relationship between managerial opti-
mism and activist-related 13D lings. Should such a pattern persist against
a variety of (yet-to-be-performed) robustness checks, it would be consistent
with an argument that managerial overcondence and investor present bias
are mismatched statistical substitutes. In turn, such a nding (if it held
up) might suggest that courts and regulators should be somewhat activist
45Including nancial controls signicantly reduces our sample size, an artifact of missing
observations in the merging process.
46See Hausman, Hall & Griliches (1984). Given some documented oddies associated
with this approach (e.g., Allison 2009), we re-ran a random e¤ects specication, obtaining
similar results.
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themselves, digging a little deeper to unpack which e¤ect predominates in a
given case (or class thereof).
We readily concede that these results are but the tip of a (potentially
enormous) empirical iceberg, and additional interrogation is surely needed.
Does this statistical tendency persist with alternative (possibly more nu-
anced) measures of managerial overcondence47? Are estimated coe¢ cients
confounded by endogeneity bias, since the decision to retain shares from ex-
ercised options is plausibly connected to expectations of activism48? Do the
results hold up against more tailored metrics for activism (e.g., engagements
where the ler is a recognized activist hedge fund)? How does the inclu-
sion of statistical proxies for short termism (e.g., Bushee 1998; 2001) interact
with these results? All these questions are important, but all must wait for
another day (and another paper).
47See, e.g., Humphrey-Jenner et al (2016) for a collection of alternative optimism proxies,
including other options-holding proxies as well as news coverage metrics.
48Although endogeneity bias confounds much of if not most of empirical corporate
nance, it is perhaps worth noting that that the hypotheses we formulate above reect
equilibrium predictions from our reduced form model. This may help mollify some concerns
around identication strategy (at least to the extent our model is correctly specied and
appropriate controls included).
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